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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




) SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 45179 
) 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 







CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
********************************* 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
********************************* 




Attention: Appellate Unit 
700 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, ID 83720 
Eric D. Fredericksen 
State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, ID 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE 5tll JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO 
·· '.0n:7/10l201703:59PM ·.':·: 
JOSEPH W. LARSEN 
I h S q.ERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT n t e upreme Court of the State of Idano Filed By: Av 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO. 
Petitioner-Appellant. 
\'. 











ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
Supreme Court D,1cket No. 45l79-2017 
Cassia County No. CV-2013-390 
A Clerk's Record \Vas tiled with this Court in prior appeal No. 41995. Arellann 1·. State 
(Cassia County No. CV-2013-390). Therefore. 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this Record on Appeal shall be AUG\ttENTED to include 
the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 41995, Arellano r. Sra1e (Cassia County No. CV-2013-
390). 
IT FURTHER (S ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and tilt: a 
CLERK ·s RECORD with this Court which shall contain the documents re4ucsted in this ~oticc of 
Appeal together with a copy or this Order, but shall not duplicate any d<.1cument included in the 
Clerk·s Record filed in prior appeal No. 41995. The CLERK"S RECORD shall be filed \Vith this 
Court by September 5, 201]/ 
DATED this ~ay of July. 2017. 
cc; Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Michael R. Crabtree 
Entered on JSJ 
Bv:~- ~' 
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Post Conviction Relief 
New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief 
Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition 
Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel 
Judge 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Michael R Crabtree 
Fees (Prisoner} 
Order GRANTING Motion for Appointment of Counsel - PUBLIC Michael R Crabtree 
DEFENDER 
Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 09/16/2013 01 :30 PM} Michael R Crabtree 
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/30/2013 09:00 AM} Motions Michael R Crabtree 
Motion to Vacate Trial and Motion to Extend Deadline and Schedule for 
filing of Dispositive Motions 
Michael R Crabtree 
Notice of Hearing - Motion to Vacate Trial and Motion to Extend Deadline Michael R Crabtree 
and Schedule for filing of Dispositive Motions 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 09/16/2013 01 :30 PM: Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing Vacated 
Court Minutes Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 9/30/2013 
Time: 10:32 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Denise Schloder 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Timothy Schneider 
Party: State of Idaho - Douglas Abenroth 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 09/30/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Michael R Crabtree 
Held Motion to Vacate Trial and Motion to Extend Deadline and Schedule 
for filing of Dispositive Motions 
Order to vacate trial and order to extend deadline and schedule for filing of Michael R Crabtree 
dispositive motions 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 02/14/2014 01 :30 PM) Michael R Crabtree 
Notice of Hearing - Court Trial Michael R Crabtree 
State's Motion for Dismissal or Alternatively, Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
Affidavit of Douglas G. Abenroth 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/30/2013 01:30 PM} State's Motion for 
Dismissal or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition 
Notice of Conflict 
Continued (Motion 01/13/2014 09:00 AM) State's Motion for Dismissal or 
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition 
Stipulation to Continue 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
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Post Conviction Relief 
Judge 
Order Allowing Additional Time to File Reply Brief and to Continue Hearing Michael R Crabtree 
Stipulation to Continue 
Order Allowing Additional Time to File Reply Brief 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Continued (Motion 01/27/2014 09:30 AM) State's Motion for Dismissal or Michael R Crabtree 
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition 
Stipulation to Continue Michael R Crabtree 
Order Allowing Additional Time to File Reply Breif and to Continue Hearing Michael R Crabtree 
Motion for Appointment of Substitute Counsel 
Affidavit of Juan Manuel Arellano 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Appointment of Substitute 
Counsel 
Clerk's Certificate Of Service 
Motion to Permit Attorney to Withdraw 
Order DENYING the Petitioner's Motion to Permit Attorney to Withdraw 
Continued (Court Trial 02/24/2014 09:00 AM) 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Continued (Motion 02/14/2014 11 :00 AM) State's Motion for Dismissal or Michael R Crabtree 
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition 
Stipulation to Continue 
Order Extending Time to File Brief & to Continue Hearings 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Objection to Motion for Summary Disposition Michael R Crabtree 
Stipulation to Vacate Hearing (Motion for Summary Disposition) Michael R Crabtree 
Notice of Hearing Vacated Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/14/2014 11 :00 AM: Hearing Michael R Crabtree 
Vacated State's Motion for Dismissal or Alternatively, Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition Michael R Crabtree 
Order GRANTING the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Michael R Crabtree 
Judgment 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 02/24/2014 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho, Defendant; Arellano, Juan 
Manuel, Subject. Filing date: 2/18/2014 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Counsel 
Affidavit of Juan Manuel Arellano 
Motion for Substitute Counsel 
Notice of Appeal 
Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Michael R Crabtree 
Fees (Prisoner) 
Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Counsel (SAPD) Michael R Crabtree 
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Post Conviction Relief 
Date 
5/29/2015 2015 Opinion No. 30 
Filed: May 27, 2015 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
6/22/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 08/21/2015 01:30 PM} 
Notice of Hearing - Court Trial 
Order Regarding Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing 
Order Re-Appointing Public Defender 
6/24/2015 Motion to Permit Attorney to Withdraw 
Order Permitting Attorney to Withdraw and Appointing Conflict Public 
Defender (David Haley} 
Remittitur 
7/7/2015 Subpoena Returned**Kent Jensen 
8/20/2015 Notice of Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 08/21/2015 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
8/21/2015 Order Appointing Conflict Public Defender- Michael P. Tribe 
8/26/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 10/15/2015 01:30 PM} 
8/27/2015 Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order 
9/3/2015 Petitioner's Disclosure of Witnesses 
Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees 
9/4/2015 Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees 
Order For Payment of Attorney Fees 
9/11/2015 Court Trial Witness List (State) 
9/16/2015 Motion to Continue 
Continued (Court Trial 01/22/2016 09:00 AM} 
Order Continuing Evidentiary Hearing 
9/30/2015 Motion For Payment Of Attorney Fees's 
Affidavit Of Michael P. Tribe For Payment Of Attorney Fees 
10/2/2015 Order for Payment of Attorney's Fees 
10/22/2015 Subpoena Returned ** Kent Jensen 
11/4/2015 Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees 
Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees 
11/5/2015 Order for Payment of Attorney Fees 
12/3/2015 Motion for Preparation of Trancsript 
Motion for Transport 
12/4/2015 Order for Transport 
Order for Preparation of Transcript 
12/10/2015 Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees 
Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for payment of Attorney Fees 
12/11/2015 Order for Payment of Attorney Fees 
User: ALEJAN ORA 
Judge 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
John K Butler 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
John K Butler 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
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Post Conviction Relief 
Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees 
Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for payment of Attorney Fees 
Ex Parte Motion to Disclose Presentence Investigation 
Order for payment of Attorney fees 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/19/2016 04:15 PM) 
Transcript Filed 
Sentencing (held 04/08/2011 in CR 2010-4251) 
Stipulated Motion to continue Evidentiary Hearing 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1/19/2016 
Time: 4: 13 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Theresa Forthun 
Tape Number: 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 01/22/2016 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 02/29/2016 01:30 PM) 
Order Continuing Evidentiary Hearing 
Order Ailowig Disclosure of Presentence Investigation 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/19/2016 04:15 PM: Hearing 
Held Motion to Disclose Presentence Investigation 
Motion for Payment of Attorney Fees 
Affidavit of Michael P. Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees 
Order for Payment of Attorney Fees 
Subpoena Returned-Kent Jensen 
Respondent's Exhibit List 
Motion for Transport 
Judge 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Order for Transport Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/23/2016 03:00 PM) Motion for Appointment Michael R Crabtree 
of New Attorney for Petitioner 
Notice of Hearing 
Motion for Appointment of New Attorney for Petitioner 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion to W/Draw 
Hearing date: 2/23/2016 
Time: 3: 13 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Roxanne Patchell 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
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Post Conviction Relief 
Judge 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/23/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing Michael R Crabtree 
Held Motion for Appointment of New Attorney for Petitioner 
Court Minutes Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing type: Status 
Hearing date: 2/29/2016 
Time: 1:33 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 02/29/2016 01 :30 PM: Hearing 
Held 
Order Appointing Conflict Public Defender - STEVEN R. MCRAE 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 03/24/2016 09:00 AM) 
Notice of Hearing - Scheduling Conference 
State's Response to Request for Discovery 
Ex-Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees 
Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees 
Order for Payment of Attorney Fees 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 03/24/2016 09:00 
AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 05/03/2016 09:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 05/09/2016 02:00 PM) 
Notice of Hearing Vacated and Reset 
Continued (Evidentiary 06/03/2016 02:00 PM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Affidavit Of Steven R. McRae 
Ex Parte Motion For Payment 
Order For Payment 
Subpoena Returned**Kent Jensen, new address 304 W 24th Burley 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Randy Stoker 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
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Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 5/3/2016 
Time: 9:15 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Denise Schloder 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: 
Post Conviction Relief 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
Judge 
Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 05/03/2016 09:00 AM: Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing Held 
Order to transport 
Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Subpoena Returned •• Kent Jensen 
Continued (Evidentiary 08/19/2016 09:00 AM) 
(Petitioner's) Exhibit List 
Notice of Hearing Vacated and Reset 
Minute Entry 
Exparte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R McRae 
Order for Payment 
Subpoena Returned Kent Jensen 
Continued (Evidentiary 09/29/2016 09:00 AM) 
Notice of Hearing Vacated and Reset 
Order to Transport 
Affidavit of Steven McRae 
Ex-Parte Motion for Payment 
Order for Payment 
Subpoena Returned**Kent Jensen 
First State's Supplemental Discovery Response 
(State's) Exhibit List 
(State's) Witness List 
EX parte Motion for payment 
Affidavit of Steven R Mcrae 
Order for Payment 
Motion to transport 
Order to Transport 
Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
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Hearing type: Status 
Hearing date: 9/21/2016 
Time: 3:36 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: 
Post Conviction Relief 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on 09/29/2016 09:00 AM: 
Continued 
Order to Transport 
Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 12/05/2016 09:00 AM) 
Notice of Hearing - Court Trial 
Continued (Court Trial 01/13/2017 09:00 AM) 
Notice Vacating and Resetting Of Evidentiary Hearing 
Subpoena Retumed**Kent Jensen 
Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
Subpoena Returned - Kent Jensen 
Motion to Transport 
Order to Transport 
Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
Second State's Supplemental Discovery Response 
Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 1/13/2017 
Time: 9:01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
User: ALEJANDRA 
Judge 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
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Post Conviction Relief 
Date 
1/13/2017 Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 01/13/2017 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
Order for Preparation of Transcript 
2/7/2017 Transcript Filed - Hearing held on 01/13/2017 
2/8/2017 Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
3/7/2017 Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
3/8/2017 Order for Payment 
3/16/2017 Petitioner's Post Trial Brief 
4/10/2017 Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
4/11/2017 Order for Payment 
4/18/2017 Stipulation for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief 
4/20/2017 Order for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief 
4/21/2017 Stipulation for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief 
4/24/2017 Order for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief 
4/26/2017 Repondent's Post-Trial Brief 
4/28/2017 Petitioner's Reply Post-Trial Brief 
5/3/2017 Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
5/8/2017 Order for Payment 
5/18/2017 Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
Judgment 
Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho, Defendant; Arellano, Juan 
Manuel, Plaintiff. Filing date: 5/18/2017 
6/5/2017 Notice of Appeal 
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender 
6/6/2017 Notice and Order For Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender 
6/8/2017 Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
7/10/2017 Order Augmenting Appeal 
7/11/2017 Ex Parte Motion For Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment 
User: ALEJANDRA 
Judge 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Jonathan Brody 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Randy Stoker 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
John K Butler 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
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l 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Docket No. 41995 
L.~, j ···eJL 









Filed: May 27, 2015 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
_______________ ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia 
County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge. 
Judgment of the district court summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction 
relief, affirmed in part, vacated in part and case remanded. 
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
GUTIERREZ, Judge 
- -- J. 
Juan Manuel Arellano appeals from the judgment of the district court summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Underlying this post-conviction relief action, Arellano entered a guilty plea to the first 
de2ree murder of his wife, except that he entered an Alfori plea to the element of malice 
aforethought, Idaho Code § 18-4001, and to the element of premeditation, I.C. § l 8-4003(a). 
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
l 
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This Court affirmed his judgment of conviction and sentence in State v. Arellano, Docket No. 
38880 (Ct. App. May 7, 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished). 
Arellano then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief with sixty-four assertions. 
He also moved the district court to appoint counsel, and counsel was appointed for him. 
Subsequently, the State moved the court to summarily dismiss the petition, and Arellano filed an 
objection to the motion for summary dismissal. The district court then issued an order 
summarily dismissing the petition. In that order, the court consolidated the sixty-four assertions 
into fourteen claims of ineffective assistance of defense counsel and one claim of an insufficient 
factual basis to support the Alford plea. In particular, the district court consolidated some of the 
assertions into what the court characterized as a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance because counsel "told Mr. Arellano that evidence of the victim's intentions and his 
mental state was not relevant." Arellano appeals, challenging the summary dismissal of this 
ineffective assistance of defense counsel claim. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Arellano argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing what the 
court characterized as a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because 
counsel "told Mr. Arellano that evidence of the victim's intentions and his mental state was not 
relevant." The district court dismissed this claim after finding that the claim was bare and 
conclusory, that Arellano did not provide admissible evidence of deficient performance, and that 
Arellano did not provide admissible evidence of prejudice. 
Idaho Code section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal of a petition pursuant to LC. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A claim for post-conviction relief 
~ill be subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima 
facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden 
of proof. DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary 
dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material 
fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. 
If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Goodwin v. State, 
2 
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138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). Summary dismissal of a petition for 
post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the State does not controvert the 
petitioner's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of 
law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. 
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Because this appeal involves an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we note that a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction 
procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P .2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the 
attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 
900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of 
showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Where, as here, the petitioner 
was convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the petitioner must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pled 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 
629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006). This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or 
strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions 
are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In his pro se petition, Arellano made several assertions concerning his mental state in 
killing his wife: 
29. Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with 
violence against his wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident because 
of the blind rage upon seeing her come back into the bar after her lover had 
escorted her out. 
30. A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state was 
lacking on all the assault charges as he was under the influence of two drugs and 
the culmination of emotions that his wife intentionally provoked. 
3 
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5 l. No one knows wh[at] petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun and 
walked out onto the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his emotions 
overwhelmed him, and wanted to rant and rave. 
52. Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the heat of 
his passion as he was attempting to scare her. He never intended to kill her, but 
the rage within was so overwhelming that he was out of control and even more by 
the acts of others. 
54. Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with a 
weapon in the heat of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she intentionally 
came back into the bar. 
Arellano also asserted that defense counsel provided deficient performance and prejudiced him: 
53. Under the professional norms counsel's assistance amounted to 
incompetence. Counsel failed entirely in his representation. 
55. Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not 
functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
56. Petitioner asserts that there exist[s] a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel's representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial. 
57. Counsel's failures prejudice[d] petitioner and ifhe would have fulfilled his 
obligations he would never have been convicted of any of the charges filed by 
information. 
58. Petitioner advised his attorney [ ot] his version of the facts surrounding the 
death of his wife. Yet counsel insisted that some of these facts were irrelevant, 
and that if he went to trial he would be found guilty. As a result of counsel 
refusing to participate in petitioner's defense he entered a guilty plea. 
This Court interprets assertion 58, based on the other relevant assertions listed in the 
petition, to aver that Arellano informed defense counsel about his mental state when he killed his 
wife and that defense counsel informed him that facts concerning his mental state were 
irrelevant. This interpretation is bolstered by Arellano's objection to the motion for summary 
dismissal, in which counsel explained that Arellano "avers that his [defense] counsel advised him 
that his mental state at the time of the alleged incident was not relevant to the case." This 
interpretation is also consistent with the district court's characterization of the claim, in which it 
explained that '"Arellano contends that [defense counsel] told him that evidence of the victim's 
intentions and his mental state ... was not relevant." 
However, unlike the district court, we are persuaded that the claim is not bare and 
conclusory, and we are also persuaded that there is admissible evidence supporting the claim. 
4 
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Arellano' s pro se claim is not artfully pied, yet the assertions listed above do add up to a claim 
asserting that defense counsel provided deficient performance by advising him that facts 
concerning Arellano's mental state when he killed his wife were irrelevant. Taking the other 
factual assertions offered by Arellano as true about the circumstances leading up to his wife's 
death, Arellano's mental state was relevant, as Arellano explained that he was in "a blind rage" 
after seeing his wife return to the bar and that his rage was "overwhelming." Indeed, evidence 
challenging the premeditation element of first degree murder might lead a jury to convict of the 
lesser charge of second degree murder, LC. § l 8-4003(a) and (g), and the unlawful killing of a 
human being in the heat of passion is voluntary manslaughter, not murder, LC. § 18-4006. 
Therefore, Arellano' s assertions support a prima facie case of deficient performance by defense 
counsel when, as Arellano alleges, counsel insisted that facts concerning Arellano' s mental state 
when Arellano killed his wife were irrelevant. 
Arellano's assertions also set forth a prima facie case of prejudice. Beyond claiming that 
he would not have pied guilty and insisted on going to trial, Arellano asserted that he pied guilty 
··[a]s a result of counsel refusing to participate in [his] defense." These assertions compliment 
the fact that Arellano entered an Alford plea by which he refused to admit to the elements of 
malice aforethought and premeditation--elements that separate voluntary manslaughter from 
murder and separate second degree murder from first degree murder respectively. Taken 
together, Arellano has presented prima facie evidence of a reasonable probability that he would 
not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, but for defense counsel's alleged 
deficient performance. 
Although the district court also stated that Arellano did not "provide[] admissible 
evidence," this is not so. Arellano's assertions concerning his mental state, what he told defense 
counsel, and what counsel told him were within his personal knowledge; these assertions were 
set forth in a verified petition, in which Arellano swore that "all statements" in his petition were 
"true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge and belief." See I.C. § l 9-4902(a) 
(requiring "[f]acts within the personal knowledge of the [petitioner] ... be sworn to affirmatively 
as true and correct.''); LC. § 19-4903 (similarly requiring facts within the petition based upon 
personal knowledge to be verified, as provided in LC. § 19-4902). The district court, in 
considering whether to gfflnt the State's motion for summary dismissal, must consider ''the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, 
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together with any affidavits submitted." LC.§ l9-4906(c). Therefore, for purposes of summary 
dismissal, a petitioner's assertions in a petition based upon personal knowledge and properly 
verified are admissible evidence and must be accounted for in deciding whether to grant 
summary dismissal. Here, Arellano's assertions were admissible evidence. 
In summary, Arellano's claim, as characterized by the district court, was not bare and 
conclusory, and the claim did allege a prima facie case of deficient performance and prejudice. 
The claim was backed by assertions that were admissible evidence for the district court to 
consider in deciding whether to grant the State's motion for summary dismissal. Hence, the 
State was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.2 Accordingly, we vacate 
that portion of the judgment summarily dismissing this claim. As to all other claims alleged in 
Arellano's petition for post-conviction relief, the judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judge LANSING and Judge ORA TTON CONCUR 
2 We do not express an opinion on whether Arellano's cla~ ~ill pr~vail in the di~ct 
court following an evidentiary hearing. Rather, our scope of review 1s ltm1ted to ascertammg 
whether the district court properly summarily dismissed the claim. 
6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 




. • l 
'' 
The Petitioner Juan Manuel Arellano (hereafter "Mr. Arellano'') entered an Alford plea of 
guilty to the offense of murder in the first degree with a sentence enhancement for the use of a 
firearm in Cassia County case CR-2010-4251. On May 3, 2013, Mr. Arellano filed the Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief (hereafter "Petition") in this case. The State filed a Motion for 
Dismissal Pursuant to Section 19-4906(b) or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition 
Pursuant to Section 19-4906(c) (hereafter ''motion for summary disposition"). On February 18, 
2014, the court entered an order granting the State's motion for summary disposition and 
dismissed Mr. Arellano's Petition in its entirety. 
Mr. Arellano filed an appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals'affirmed this court's order 
granting the State's motion for summary disposition in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. See Arellano v. State, No. 41995, 2015 WL 2457811 (Idaho. Ct. 
ORDER REGARDING POST-CONVICTION EVlDENTIARY HEARING CV-2013-390 Page I 
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App. May 27, 2015). In the opinion on appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals quoted the following 
paragraphs from Mr. Arellano's Petition: 
29. Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with violence 
against his wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident because of the blind rage 
upon seeing her come back into the bar after her lover had escorted her out. 
30. A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state was lacking on 
all the assault charges as he was under the influence of two drugs and the culmination of 
emotions that his wife intentionally provoked. 
51. No one knows wh[at] petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun and walked out 
onto the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his emotions overwhelmed him. and 
wanted to rant and rave. 
52. Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the heat of his passion 
as he was attempting to scare her. He never intended to kill her, but the rage within was 
so overwhelming that he was out of control and even more by the acts of others. 
53. Under the professional norms counsel's assistance amounted to incompetence. 
Counsel failed entirely in his representation. 
54. Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with a weapon in the 
heat of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she intentionally came back into the 
bar. 
55. Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not functioning as the 
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
56. Petitioner asserts that there exist[s] a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial. 
57. Counsel's failures prejudice[d] petitioner and if he would have fulfilled his 
obligations he would never have been convicted of any of the charges filed by 
information. 
58. Petitioner advised his attorney [ of] his version of the facts surrounding the death of 
his wife. Yet counsel insisted that some of these facts were irrelevant, and that if he went 
to trial he would be found guilty. As a result of counsel refusing to participate in 
petitioner's defense he entered a guilty plea. 
ORDER REGARDING POST-CONVICTION EVIDENTIARY HEARING CV-2013-390 Page 2 
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The foregoing paragraphs from the Petition set forth the only claim that remains 
following the appeal. This case is currently set for an LC. § 19-4907 evidentiary hearing 
regarding this claim on August 21. 2015. Since the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of all of Mr. Arellano's other post-conviction claims, the court considers evidence 
regarding the dismissed post-conviction claims to be irrelevant and inadmissible pursuant to 
I.R.E. 401 and 402. 
.J 
It is so ORDERED this 2 2 day of June, 2015. . / ---~---~- / 
~~~ 
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of June, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
1. Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney 
1459 Overland Avenue 
P.O. Box7 
Burley, ID 83318 
2. Cassia County Public Defender 
P.O. Box 188 
Burley, ID 83318 
v/ e-mail -dnoriyuki@cassiacounty.org 
v/ e-mail - mspeers@cassiacounty.org 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT THE 51" JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY CASSIACOUNTY,IDAHO 
' On: 8/27/2015 02:35 PM 
JOSEPH W. LARSEN 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO 
CLERK OF THE Dl~ICT COURT 
CASE NO. CV-2013-0000390 D Flied~) 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
SCHEDULING ORDER, 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING 
AND INITIAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
Presiding Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40. unless the parties stipulate otherwise using the 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning document accompanying this Order, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED: 
1. TRIAL: This case is set for COURT TRIAL as follows: 
Court Trial: Thursday, October 15, 2015, Time: 01:30 PM 
A total of Yz day has been reserved. 
2. DEADLINES WILL BE ENFORCED AT COURT'S DISCRETION: The deadlines set 
forth in this Order are for the benefit of the Court in managing this case, and they will be enforced 
at the Court's discretion. Any party seeking to alter any deadline shall file a motion and notice of 
hearing. 
3. AL TERNA TE JUDGES: Notice is given that the presiding judge intends to utilize the 
provisions of I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(G). An alternate judge may be assigned to preside at trial or at any 
other hearing or proceeding in the case. The panel of alternate judges consists of the following 
judges who otherwise have not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan, Brody, Butler, Elgee, 
Hurlbutt, McDermott, Schroeder, Stoker, Wildman and Williamson. 
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4. DEADLINE FOR PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All non-dispositive pre-trial motions must 
be filed and scheduled to be heard not less than fourteen (14) days before trial. Exceptions will be 
granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires. 
5. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: 
a. Motions for summary disposition must be filed and served so as to be heard no later 
than thirty (30) days before trial. 
b. The party moving for summary disposition shall prepare as separate documents: (a) 
motion, (b) legal memorandum containing a statement of reasons in support of the 
motion, and (c) a concise statement of the material facts. Each statement of a fact shall 
include a reference to the particular place in the record which supports that fact. The 
legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the elements 
of any claim or defense relevant to the motion. 
c. The party opposing a motion for summary disposition shall prepare as separate 
documents: (a) legal memorandum containing a statement of reasons in opposition to 
the motion, and (b) a concise statement of the facts which are genuine issues of 
material fact and/or which are material facts omitted from the moving party's 
statement of facts. Each statement of a fact must be supported by admissible evidence 
and shall include a reference to the place in the record which supports that fact. The 
legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the elements 
of any claim or defense relevant to the motion. 
d. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in LR.C.P. 56(c) is hereby 
MODIFIED as follows: 
1. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at least thirty-five 
(35) days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
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u. The adverse party shall serve an answering brief and opposing affidavits, if 
any, at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of the hearing. 
iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less than fourteen 
(14) days before the date of the hearing. 
e. The hearing on a motion for summary disposition will be set AFTER the moving 
party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and statement of facts. The 
hearing date can then be obtained from the judge's court clerk. This pertains to all 
motions for summary disposition and motions for partial summary disposition. 
6. MOTION FILING AND HEARINGS: All motions must be filed and served at least 
fourteen (14) days prior to hearing. Scheduling of hearings will be through Deputy Clerk Tara 
Gunderson ((208) 878-7152). Hearings on motions (except motions for summary disposition or 
hearings at which testimony is to be offered) may be conducted by telephone conference call 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(4). Counsel requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for 
the cost of the call, for setting up the call, and for joining the opposing party on the call. 
7. WITNESS DISCLOSURES: 
a. Each party shall disclose the existence and identity of intended or potential expert or 
lay witnesses not less than forty-two (42) days before trial. Any witness who has not 
been timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify at trial upon objection by the 
aggrieved party. 
b. The disclosure of expert witnesses shall include a complete statement of all opinions to 
be expressed; the basis and reasons for the opinion; the data or other information 
considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a 
summary of or support for the opinions; any qualifications of the witness; the 
compensation to be paid for the testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which 
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the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years. 
8. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: 
a. A party must identify and disclose any exhibits that party intends or reserves the right 
to offer at trial. Not less than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge 
with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in the form attached to this order (Exhibit 1) 
and one duplicate marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Court's use 
during trial; and (B) deliver to counsel for the other party a copy of the exhibit list and 
a copy of the party's marked exhibits. 
b. Any exhibit which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded. The exhibit list 
and duplicate copies need not include exhibits offered solely for the purpose of 
impeachment. 
c. Exhibits shall be pre-marked. Unless otherwise ordered, the plaintiff shall identify 
exhibits beginning with number "l," and the defendant shall identify exhibits 
beginning with letter "A." 
9. ELEMENT SHEETS: Element Sheets shall be filed with the Clerk (with copies to the 
presiding judge's chambers) no later than seven (7) days before trial. Each party's Element Sheet 
shall set forth the elements of each claim and the proposed evidence, in specific detail, which the 
party believes in good faith will prove each element of the claim and/or affirmative defense. The 
Element Sheets will be similar to final "issue" instructions given to juries (see IDJI 1.40.1 through 
1.41.4.3). 
10. REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: A request to vacate or continue an existing 
trial setting, with or \Vi.thout a stipulation, will be granted only for unusual and unforeseen 
circumstances and when the interests of substantial justice to the litigants so require. A party 
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requesting to vacate or continue a trial shall file a written statement concerning the reasons for the 
request. The requesting party shall certify that the request or stipulation has been discussed with the 
other parties. 
11. JUDICIAL NOTICE: A request for the Court to take judicial notice of any documents not 
in the post-conviction file must comply with I.R.E. 201. Counsel shall provide authenticated copies 
of the documents to be judicially noticed under separate cover. 
DATED this 'V day of August, 2015. 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that this,:.:; day of August, 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND 
INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
1. Michael Patrick Tribe 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 396 
Rupert ID 83350 
2. Douglas G Abenroth 
Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.0.Box 7 
Burley ID 83318 
/ 
V.,, email: mpU@.idlawfirm.com 
,.,/ 
~ email: dnoriyuki@cassiacounty.org 
,> ........ 
/ ,j 
( ·-· I 
,:.:·.-c_ Ii 1 /rr /V::-) l---
Tara Gund~rson 
Deputy Qlerk 
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JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Id tifi en 1er D escnpt1on 
Case No: CV-2013-0000390 D 
Exhibit List 
Plaintiff Defendant 
Identified By Date Offered 
Exhibit 1 to Scheduling Order 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE 5111 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO· 
Filed By: i. f~ 
On: 1/19/2016 04:35 PM 
JOSEPH W. LARSEN . 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2013-0000390 
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1/19/2016 
Time: 4:13 pm 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Theresa Forthun 
Interpreter: Noemi Alanis 
4:15pm Court introductions 
4:1spm All parties are present and with Counsel 
Interpreter is present for petitioner 
4:15pm Doug Abenroth addresses court re: Set Evidentiary Hearing for Feb. 29, 2016 @ 1 :30pm 
4:18pm Court discusses 2nd motion 
4:18pm Mike Tribe addresses court. 
4:20pm Court addresses Mike Tribe 
4:20pm Mike Tribe addresses court re: Information in PSI. Would like to thoroughly review all 
matters in PSI. 
4:21pm Doug Abenroth OBJECTS to PSI. Cites reasons. 
4:22pm Court addresses Counsel regarding State vs. Adams 
4:26pm Court grants motion. Court states that Counsel will need to get in touch with clerk regarding 
PSI 
4:26pm Court signs Order 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2013-0000390 
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Hearing type: State's Motion for Appointment of New Counsel 
Hearing date: 2/23/2016 
Time: 3: 13 pm 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Courtroom: # 1 
Court reporter: Roxanne Patchell 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
The Court reviews the State's motion for appointment of new counsel. 
Douglas Abenroth reviews considerations for the State's Motion for Appointment of New 
Counsel; cites considerations. 
J:17 p.m. Michael Tribe has no objection; defers to the Court. 
3:17 p.m. The Court would like consent in writing; cites considerations. 
Michael Tribe addresses the Court. 
The Court leaves the trial as set and transport on. 
Michael Tribe addresses the Court. 
Douglas Abenroth addresses the Court. 
The Court converts the trial on Monday to a Status Conference. 
3:26 p.m. Court in recess. 
llPage 
30
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO 
Flied By: Tara 
On: 2/29/2016 at 01:34 PM 
JOSEPH LARSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO 
Plaintiff, 
Vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant, 
Hearing date: 2/29/2016 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
CASE NO. CV-2013-0000390 D 
COURT MINUTES 
Status Conference 
Time: 1 :33 pm 
Courtroom: # 1 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
Noemi Alanis is present to interpret. 
Counsel waive the presence of the Court Reporter, no objection to proceeding with the 
electronic recording. 
The Court does not conclude that there is an actual conflict with Michael Tribe; cites 
considerations. 
t:35 p.m. Michael Tribe addresses the Court; cites they have agreed that it would be best to have 
new counsel be appointed; cites considerations. 
The State has no further comments. 
The Court thanks Mr. Tribe for his services and grants the motion to withdraw and will 
appoint new counsel. 
1:38 p.m. Court in recess. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2013-0000390 
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 5/3/2016 
Time: 9:15 am 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Courtroom: # 1 
Court reporter: Denise Schloder 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
The defendant is not present. 
Douglas Abenroth addresses the Court. 
The Court inquires of Counsel re: transport order. 
Steven McRae cites he will need a transport order; reviews status of case. 
Evidentiary hearing is set for June 03, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. 
9:17 a.m. Court in recess. 
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Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984] 
Brian J. Hilverda [ISB No. 7952] 
Guy B. Zimmerman [ISB No. 9765] 
HIL VERDA MCRAE, PLLC 
812 Shoshone Street East 
P.O. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755 
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041 
smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Arellano's Exhibit List 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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Arellano's Exhibit List 
Judgment of Conviction and 
Order 
Psychological Report 
Memorandum in Support of 
Rule 35 Motion with 
Authority Cited 
Rule 35 Motion 
Affidavit in Support of 
Criminal Complaint 
Notice That Death Penalty 
Will Not be Sought Re: First 
Degree Murder 
Affidavit oflrma Ovalle 
Amended Information 
Information 
State's Response to 
Discovery Request 
First State's Supplemental 
Discovery Response 
Second State's Supplemental 
Discovery Response 
Third State's Supplemental 
Discovery Response 
Fourth State's Supplemental 
Discovery Response 
Fifth State's Supplemental 
Discovery Response 
Seventh State's Supplemental 
Discovery Response 
Eighth State's Supplemental 
Discovery Response 
Ninth State's Supplemental I 
· Discovery Response I 
I Tenth State's Supplemental Discovery Response 
Eleventh State's I I 
Supplemental Discovery ' 
I I Rcsp<?nse .... _______ ··---.. -
I 
Twelfth State's Supplemental ! 
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EXHIBIT LIST 
14 COMES NOW Douglas G. Abenroth, Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia County, Idaho, 
15 and moves the Court to submit the following exhibit list for the evidentiary hearing scheduled for 
16 September 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.: 
1 7 1. Photos cell phone text messages and cell phone call log; 
18 2. Transcript of translated text messages from Spanish to English; 
19 3. Transcript on Appeal; 
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I hereby certify that on th' ' day of August, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Exhibit List to be serve t pon following: 
Steve McRae 
IO Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1233 
11 Twin Falls, Idaho 83303 
12 by depositing a copy thereof in the United States mail. postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed to 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CASSIA COUN~HO 
FiledB~ 
On: 9/21/2016 at: 03:39 PM 
JOSEPH LARSEN 
CLERIC OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO 
Plaintiff, 
Vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Hearing date: 9/21/2016 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae 
State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth 
All parties are present with Counsel. 
Noemi Alanis is present to interpret. 
CASE NO. CV-2013-0000390 D 
COURT MINUTES 
Status Conference 
Time: 3:36 pm 
Courtroom: # 1 
Minutes Cleric Tara Gunderson 
Steven McRae addresses the Court, moves the Court for continuance of trial; cites 
considerations. 
3:41 p.m. Douglas Abenroth addresses the Court. 
3:44 p.m. Response by Steven McRae. 
3:45 p.m. The Court addresses Counsel; will vacate trial. 
Counsel to get back with the derk to reschedule the trial date. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-2013-0000390 D 
COURT MINUTES 
Post-Conviction Court Trial Vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Hearing date: 1/13/2017 Time: 9:01 am 
Courtroom: # 1 Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 





Naomi Alanis and Heather Hagen are present to interpret. 
Steven McRae addresses the Court re: concurrent and consecutive interpretation. 
Interpreter addresses the Court. 
Steven McRae cites the parties stipulate to the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 128A -
Disk; addresses the Court re: written closing arguments; cites considerations. 
Douglas Abenroth cites the State is in agreement 
Counsel waive opening statements. 
Steven McRae calls Plaintiff's# 1 Witness - Kent Jensen, witness sworn by clerk. 
Direct examination of witness by Steven McRae. 
Steven McRae moves for the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit # 102 - Kent Jensen's 
notes. 
No objection by the State. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 102- Kent Jensen's Notes -ADMITTED. 
Steven McRae moves for the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit # 101 - Invoice of Kent 
Jensen. 
Douglas Abenroth cites the State stipulates to the admission. 

















Plaintiff's Exhibit# 101 - Invoice of Kent Jensen -ADMITTED. 
Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintiff1s Exhibit 106 - guilty plea advisory form. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 106 - Guilty Plea Advisory Form -ADMITTED. 
Steven McRae moves for the admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit # 109 - Psychological 
Report. 
No objection by the State. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 109-Psychological Report-ADMITTED. 
Court in recess. 
Court resumes. 
Kent Jensen remains under oath and continues to review plaintiff exhibit # 102; Direct 
examination of witness by Steven McRae continues. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 103 - Transcript of Preliminary Hearing - ADMITTED by 
stipulation. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit # 104 - Transcript of Arraignment, Change of Plea and 
Sentencing Hearings -ADMITTED by stipulation 
Counsel Stipulate to the Admission of Plaintiff's Exhibits 117 through 128A. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits# 117 through# 128A are ADMITTED. 
Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintiff's exhibit 105- Sentencing Memorandum with 
Authority Cited. 
Plaintiff's exhibit # 105- Sentencing Memorandum with Authority Ched -
ADMITTED 
Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibit 107 - Plea Agreement 
Plaintiff's exhibit# 107- Plea Agreement-Admitted. 
Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibit 108 - Judgment of Conviction. 
Plaintiff's exhibit# 108-Judgment of Conviction. 
Witness reviews Plaintitrs Exhibit 105 - sentencing memorandum. 
Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs Exhibits # 11 O and # 111. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit # 110 - Memorandum in Support of Rule 35 Motion -
ADMITTED 
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 111 - Rule 35 Motion -ADMITTED. 
11:11 a.m. Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibits# 113 
Plaintiff's Exhibh # 113 - Notice re: Death Penalty-ADMITTED. 
Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibits # 115 & 116 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit# 115 -Amended Information -ADMITTED. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 116- lnfonnation -ADMITTED. 
11 :13 a.m. Court in recess. 
11 :2oa.m. Court resumes. 
Steven McRae has no further questions. 
11:21 a.m. Cross examination of witness by Douglas Abenroth on behalf of the State. 
11:27 a.m. Douglas Abenroth moves for the admission of Defendant's Exhibit # A - photo of text 
messages. 
No objection by the Plaintiff. 
Defendant's Exhibit A - Photos of Text Messages -ADMITTED. 
11:35a.m. Counsel stipulate to the admission of Defendant's Exhibit B - translated text messages. 
Defendant's Exhibit B - translated text messages-ADMITTED. 
Counsel offer clarification re: exhibit. 
11:40a.m. 
11:58a.m. 
Objection by Steven McRae; to offer understanding and clarification - cites considerations. 
Court in recess. 
1:32p.m. Court resumes. 
Cross examination, of Plaintiffs# 1 Witness - Kent Jensen, continues. 
1:41 p.m. Re-direct examination of witness my Steven McRae. 
Counsel have no further questions - the witness steps down. 
The State holds the subpoena in case of rebuttal. 
Kent Jensen is excused, instructs the witness that he remains under subpoena and to not 
discuss this case. 
1
=
4sp.m. Court in recess 
1:52 p.m. Court resumes. 
Steven McRae calls Plaintiffs # 2 witness - Juan Manuel Arellano, sworn by 
Clerk. 
Direct Examination of witness by Steven McRae. 
2
=
18 p.m. Cross Examination of witness by Douglas Abenroth. 
2:19 p.m. Objection by Steven McRae. 
Objection Overruled. 




23 p.m. Objection by Steven McRae, cites asked and answered. 







The Court cites the point is clear, instructs counsel to next question. 
Counsel have no further questions - the witness steps down. 
The Petitioner rests. 
Court in recess. 
Court resumes. 
Douglas Abenroth cites the State has no witnesses to call. 
The Court cites this concludes the proof. 
McRae reviews briefing requests; requests preparation of transcript. 
Plaintiff's brief due 30 days after filing of transcript 
State has will have 30 days to respond. 
Plaintiff's Final Reply due 14 days thereafter. 
Counsel waive any formal argument. 
Court in recess. 
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Case No. CV-2013-390 
PETITIONER'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Juan Manuel Arellano ("Arellano"), by and through his 
attorney of record, Steven R. McRae of the finn Hilverda McRae, PLLC, and submits this Post-
Trial Brief following trial in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
The argument is this matter is framed by the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in this case 
in Arellano v. State, Idaho Ct. of Appeals Docket No. 41995, May 27, 2015. At its essence, the 
issue presented on this post-conviction matter is whether Arellano's attorney in the underlying 
case, Kent Jensen ("Jensen"), properly advised him as to the law and elements as they relate to 
first-degree murder, second~degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter and whether Jensen 
advised Arellano appropriately in the application of the facts to each of these three charges. Id. 
PETITIONER'S POST·TR!AL BRIEF· I 
43
At this time, after the trial in this matter, Arellano wishes to further define the scope of his 
argument. As is discussed below, Arellano now argues that Kent Jensen was deficient in his 
performance as Arellano's attorney as follows: 1) Jensen failed to advise Arellano as to the 
elements and application of facts as they relate to second-degree murder (and the difference of 
second-degree murder from first-degree murder) and specifically the elements of malice 
aforethought and premeditation, and 2) Jensen failed to understand and/or communicate with 
Arellano the impact of a potential second-degree murder conviction. 
As is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision, this matter is based upon an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, and as such, "To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the 
petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency." Id. citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984). 
1. Jensen's performance as Arellano's attorney was deficient in his advice on second-
degree murder and the application of the facts of the case as they relate to the same. 
Arellano first asserts that it is clear from the facts of his underlying criminal matter and 
from testimony presented at trial that Jensen had a duty to inform Arellano as to the application 
of the elements and facts of the case to first-degree murder, the lesser included charge of second-
degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. Arellano does not herein seek to set forth all of the 
facts that would set forth this clear application to the case 1. In fact, Jensen admitted at trial that 
the primary issue in Arellano's case was what charge would be appropriate in the underlying 
facts. See Transcript atl 7, LL 8-18. However, in the event that the State seeks to argue that 
Jensen was not required to analyze the case under each of these potential charges (and 
specifically to second-degree murder), Arellano will set forth such foundation in his reply. 
1 Such an analysis would review all of the facts contained in the discovery in the underlying criminal case, as was 
admitted as Exhibits l l 7- l 28A at trial, the notations of Kent Jensen as were admitted in Exhibit 2 at trial, as well as 
the testimony produced by Jensen at trial. 
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However, with this basic understanding that Jensen was required to analyze the case - and 
discuss such analysis with Arellano - as to all three potential charges, this matter becomes 
primarily a factual inquiry as to whether Jensen fulfilled such required performance as 
Arellano's attorney. 
a. Jensen focused only upon voluntary manslaughter and failed to analyze second-
degree murder when considering the facts of Arellano's case. 
To start the factual inquiry in this matter, Arellano asserts that Jensen focused on 
voluntary manslaughter in his analysis of Arellano's case and failed to analyze or discuss the 
potential of second-degree murder. Throughout all of Jensen's testimony, he made it absolutely 
clear that his primary focus was on making a voluntary manslaughter argument in Arellano's 
case. See Transcript at 17, LI. 23 through 18, LL 1; at 19, LL 16-25; 23, LL 3-9 ("My focus was 
on the idea of voluntary manslaughter, okay? I don't recall w/Jetl,er I /tad a specific disc11ssion 
at tlie time wit/, liim regarding tl,e differences between the hvo, but I did explain to him what 
voluntary manslaughter was, and that's why we were focusing on his state of mind, the marriage, 
the problems that were ongoing at the time.") (emphasis added); at 59, LL 23 through 60, LI. 16; 
at 82, IL 8-10 ( ... we were/oc11sing on vol11ntary manslaughter . .. ) (emphasis added); at 84, 
LL 7-9 (wherein Jensen shows his focus is only on voluntary manslaughter and first degree 
murder); at 106, LL 4-19; and at P. 113, LL 5-8 (wherein Jensen establishes again that his focus 
was on only voluntary manslaughter and first degree murder). 
In fact, Jensen admitted that the sole defense that he was focused on was voluntary 
manslaughter. Transcript at 31, LI. 3-6. Jensen describes voluntary manslaughter was 
Arellano's "best defense" and as such was the sole focus of Jensen's inquiry. Id. at 47, LL 12-15 
and at 48, LL 2-11. 
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Jensen further admitted in his testimony that he had no discussions with Arellano in 
regards to second-degree murder, but instead focused only upon making a case for voluntary 
manslaughter: 
Q. What did you tell or what did you explain to Mr. Arellano was the 
tlifference between first degree murder and second degree murder? 
A. Well, t/1e explanation centered on, before we were looking at 
manslaughter. You go to the bar, you' re there, all of a sudden your wife 
comes in with another man, you're upset, you walk out, shoot her. 
Explained to llim tl,at tl,at's something that /1appens in the /,eat of 
passion. Tl,e law looks at that differently. There's a potential maximum 
penalty, 15 years, as I recall for voluntary manslaughter. I explained that 
to him. 
I then explained to him once we got this text message it changed the focus 
there. I said, the problem that you have at this point in the case is that you 
were in the bar with your pistol. There was no indication that you left the 
bar, went out to the car and got your pistol and came back in and shot her. 
You were there with your pistol, she walked in and you shot her, and now 
they have a message that you sent within a few hours of this occurring, 
saying that you were going to, basically, kill her. At lest that's what the 
message seems to indicate. 
I explained to him that that changes that. We were going to have an 
impossible task ofconvincing a iury that you did this in the !,eat of 
passion, based on tl,e fact that yo11 sent a text message out, you liad your 
pistol inside tlle bar, and tltis was a place sl,e was going to be showing 
up at, by probabilities, and tltey you slroot lier. 
Transcript at 39, LL 19 through 40, LL 21. (emphasis added). Thus, even upon being asked 
about second-degree murder, Jensen only focuses on a heat of passion/ voluntary manslaughter 
defense in his answer at the trial in this matter. Further, Jensen testified: 
Q .... And I heard you discussing a lot about voluntary manslaughter. 
Did you have any discussions with Mr. Arellano about the difference 
between first degree and second degree murder? 
A. You know, I don't recall l1ow detailed those discussions would /,ave 
been. I'd looked at it, I know I researched and looked at the statutes and 
talked to him about it. I'm pretty sure I told llim that there wasn't a 
wl,ole lot of difference between tl,e two statutes, but there wouldn't be 
any deat/1 penalty involved with second degree murder. But I don't know 
how specific. I just don't recall. 
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Id at 41, LL 7-18. ( emphasis added). Jensen later admitted that he did not consider second-
degree murder "in play" in Arellano's case: 
A ... I couldn't get [the prosecutor] to accept anything less than [first 
degree murder J. So as far as second degree murder goes, I don't recall if 
it was ever in play, otl,er than I guess it could /,ave been a potential 
lesser inch,ded offense tl,an tlte first degree murder if t/1e case /tad gone 
to trial. 
Id. at 76, LL 14-19. (Emphasis added). Finally, Jensen admitted outright that he did not speak 
with Arellano in regards to the difference between first degree murder and second degree 
murder: 
Q. And you don't specifically recall having discussion with him about the 
difference between a first degree murder charge and a second degree 
murder charge? 
A. To tell you tl,e trutl,, I don't. And I believe part of the reason/or 
tJ,at was that Mr. Cannon j11st didn't make that offer to 11s at all. 
Id. at I 01, Ll. 17-20. With this clear admission of Jensen, Arellano was never advised as to the 
potential of a second degree murder charge or its interplay with the facts of Arellano's case -
simply because Jensen did not think that the prosecutor would offer it, and despite his admission 
that it would be a potential lesser included offense had the case gone to trial. 
Additionally, Jensen's focus solely on voluntary manslaughter became readily apparent 
after the text message was discovered to Jensen and Arellano2• After receiving the discovery of 
the text message of Arellano, Jensen admitted that he only focused on this evidence's application 
to voluntary manslaughter and not to second-degree murder: 
A. The conversation involved looking at the evidence from wit at wo11/d 
be establislted and if we we11t al,ead wit!, tl,e voluntary manslaughter 
defense. They would use the text to show that he had designs to carry out 
this crime. that he'd thought about it and sent a text message ahead. Mr. 
Arellano disagreed with that particular point. 
2 The specific text message at issue was interpreted to say, "I'm going to kill that whore", as was discussed at length 
in trial. 
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So, I didn't think we could win a voluntary mansla11ghter defe11se, so at 
that point we were trying to figure 0111 tl,e best option for Mr. Arellano. 
I discussed with him that he could enter a plea. He wouldn't have to 
acknowledge that particular element of the crime, we could take advantage 
of the plea agreement which had been offered and we could- as I stated 
earlier, we could actually argue for less at sentencing. 
Id. at 59, LI. 23 through 60, LI. 16 ( emphasis added). From this testimony, it is clear that Jensen 
solely focused on the voluntary manslaughter defense, as he could not describe in any detail, any 
explanation or analysis he may have discussed with Arellano as it related to second-degree 
murder. Moreover, Jensen stated furthi::r in regards to the text message: 
A. ... But once that text message showed upon that cl,anged tl,e 
calculus because it was going to he very hard for us to walk in and argue 
that he did all of t!,is in the heat of passion, having just sent tltis text 
earlier. So at that juncture I know we had that discussion about the 
prospects of going to trial and the difference. Whereas then the intent, 
premeditated and all that stuff, comes into play and that bolsters the state's 
case. We had that discussion, yes. 
Id. at 24, Ll. 12-20. Here, again, Jensen admits that the only consideration after receiving the 
text was that it would hurt the heat of passion/ voluntary manslaughter argument. He later 
explained that he thought the text, "blew a hole right through the voluntary manslaughter 
defense", again, with no discussion as to how it may or may not have affected a second-degree 
murder argument for Arellano's case. See Transcript at 85, ll. 15-20. See also Transcript at 98, 
Ll. 6-13 (" When I saw tliis particular text message witf1in two or tf,ree /tours of tl,e actual 
killing, in my opinio11, we no longer had that argument that was it was done in passion or in 
tile heat of the moment."). 
Furthermore, it is clear that Jensen should have discussed second degree murder elements 
and application to Arellano's case, specifically in consideration of information that Arellano 
provided to Mr. Jensen. In Jensen's notes, as admitted at trial as Exhibit 102 (and the 4th page 
thereof), Jensen took a note from Arellano, in which Jensen wrote, "Says went to shoot wife -
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but not there when arrived & how would know". In discussing this statement with Arellano, 
Jensen admits that it was a critical piece of infonnation: 
A. Says: Went to shoot wife, but not there when arrived. How could 
know. 
Q. So what does that mean to you? 
A. This would have been a comment that Mr. Arellano made to me. 
Q. And so to make sure I read it, it says, [ quote, it says: Went to shoot 
wife- but not there when arrived. And: how would know, end quote. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Why do you think that would have been important to take note of? 
A. Seemed to be a critical piece of information Mr. Arellano was telling 
me. 
Transcripl at 46, LL 5-17 (emphasis added). In analyzing this note from Arellano, it is clear that 
he communicated to Jensen that he was at the bar before his wife (the victim), and there was no 
indication in the facts of the case that Arellano would have known that his wife was going to 
show up at the bar. This is highly relevant in fighting the premeditation element of first-degree 
murder; as such, it is relevant to both a voluntary manslaughter defense and potential outcome of 
second-degree murder at trial. However, Jensen, in discussing this statement of Arellano and his 
note on the same, testified that he only discussed the application of the note in regards to 
voluntary manslaughter: 
A. Well, I don't know. Again, you can look at this two ways. At the 
time tire note had been made we were still tliinking of voluntary 
manslaughter. So if he's telling me he didn't know she was going to be 
there and she did show up, then we could make an argument. But that's 
the way I just wrote it down. I don't know that we /,ad anymore 
discussion about J,im going to the bar at that point. 
Q. You just said you were still going for voluntary manslaughter? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Does that mean tliat second degree murder was not in your focus at 
all? 





A. Well, I'd probably - I doubt it, because, again, it gets back to w/1at 
was tlte best defense available to ltim, and voluntary manslaugltter 
appeared to be tlte best one at that point. 
Id. at 46, LL 25 through 47, LL 15 (emphasis added). At another time, Jensen admits that he 
doesn't even know if he and Arellano discussed this information at all, let alone in the context of 
how the contents thereof might apply to second-degree murder. Jensen stated, "I don't recall if 
we did or not focus on that particular point." Id. at 42, ll. 21-22. 
Finally, another notation of Jensen is in the same line of reason and demonstrates (with 
Jensen's testimony on the same) that he failed to discuss second-degree murder with Arellano, 
despite the need to do so. Also on Exhibit 2, on the third to the last page of the same, Jensen 
wrote (while watching a video of Arellano), "I didn't expect her to show." During his testimony 
on the same, Jensen explained: 
Q. Just a couple of questions on I believe just two lines. If you look at the 
first page that has the 1 with the circle on top, about two-thirds down it 
says - if I read this right - "I guess so." Then the next line, "I didn't 
expect her to show." 
A. Correct. 
Q. And what- do you recall why you wrote that down? 
A. Well, again, it would be the whole idea of voluntary manslai,g/iter 
defense wout,l be that - basically the classic example is somebody comes 
home and finds their spouse or significant other in bed wit/1 somebody 
and shoots tl1em i11 the /teat of passion. In that particular point I made a 
note of that, that well, he said, knew he was there - on, no, "I didn't 
expect her to show up", yeah. Again, using that with regard to a voluntary 
manslaughter defense, where he's there, doesn't expect her to show up, all 
of a sudden she does show up with another man, is out dancing with that 
particular man. So that's why I would have made that particular note. 
Transcript at 56, LL 1M20 (emphasis added). Again, the fact that Arellano was not expecting his 
wife (the victim) to show is critical in considering whether there was premeditation - and as 
such, would apply to both potentials at trial of voluntary manslaughter and second-degree 
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murder. And, when Jensen explains the application, he again completely misses the potential 
application towards second-degree murder. 
All of the foregoing demonstrate that there was a significant need for Jensen to explain 
and discuss all of the elements of first-degree murder, second-degree murder and voluntary 
manslaughter with Arellano. However, it is clear that Jensen only focused on first-degree 
murder and voluntary manslaughter, leaving out in its entirety a significant potential outcome of 
Arellano's case a potential second degree murder conviction. Arellano, in not having any 
explanation as to second-degree murder in entering his Alford plea to first-degree murder, 
entered his plea without being provided the needed details for him to make a reason and 
informed decision in entering his plea. And, this deficiency is clearly based upon Jensen failing 
to discuss the elements and application of the facts to the same on second-degree murder. 
b. Jensen's knowledge of the difference between first-degree murder and second-
degree murder was clearly flawed, and as such, Jensen clearly could not have 
adequately advised Arellano prior to his entering a guilty plea. 
Next, in considering whether Jensen appropriately advised Arellano as to the potential 
outcome of second-degree murder, it is clear from Jensen's testimony that Jensen did not even 
understand difference between first-degree murder nor did he understand the difference that 
having a second-degree murder conviction would make at sentencing. 
First, as to the elements of first degree murder and second degree murder, at trial, Jensen 
testified: 
Q .... [C]an you tell me all of the elements mental elements of first 
degree murder that you discussed with Mr. Arellano? 
A. Well, I can't tell you specifically. It's been too long ago. But the 
discussion would have revolved around the facts. The fact that he was 
sending a text; the fact of him going in with a pistol, a loaded gun, and to a 
place where he could anticipate she would show up, and that those specific 
things indicated that he had a plan that he was devising or had devised that 
he was going to use in carrying out the crime. 
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Transcript at 113, LL 8-18. Jensen was unable to identify the elements (or the difference in 
elements) as to first-degree murder and second-degree murder. In every question relating to the 
elements of second-degree murder, Jensen always testified as to the facts of the case without 
providing any detail as to what he knew the elements to be. 
What's worse is that in Jensen's testimony as to the elements of first-degree murder (and 
the difference between second-degree murder), Jensen was wrong as to what malice is. Jensen 
testified (in discussing Arellano's change of plea as an Alford plea): 
Q .... And here the court was talking about - had said malice 
aforethought or premeditation element. And did you see those two 
elements as being the same thing? 
A. No, not necessarily, because I think if you !,ave malice aforethought 
that's a little higher standard than premeditation. 
Q. What do you mean by that? 
A. Malice generally implies that it's something a little beyond just- I 
guess I would consider malice aforethought as to wliere somebody sits 
down and decides to - plans to commit a crime probably maybe even in a 
way that could be way beyond w/zat we would even consider - if there 
was anything to be said about a normal murder type of a case - but it 
certainly reflects more of an evil i11tent titan what I would consider 
premeditation. 
Transcript at 63, Ll. 19 through 64, LL 5 (emphasis added). Jensen's consideration of malice 
aforethought as a higher standard than premeditation flies in the face of the law in the State of 
Idaho. It is clear under Idaho law that malice is an element of both first and second degree 
murder. See Idaho Code§§ 18-4001, 4002, and 4003; State v. Dunlap, 125 Idaho 530,531,873 
P.2d 784, 785 (1993); and State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 362, 690 P.2d 293, 297 (1984). In 
fact, it is clear from the aforementioned citations that it is premeditation that distinguishes first 
degree murder from second degree murder. As such, Jensen, in thinking that "malice 
aforethought that's a little higher standard than premeditation" is completely incorrect. And, it 
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appears, then, that Jensen could not and did not properly advise Arellano as to the appropriate 
elements of first-degree murder and second-degree murder. 
This is even more important in considering that Arellano entered an Alford plea to the 
malice aforethought and premeditation. See, Exhibit I 04, Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing 
("COP Transcript'') at 18, LL 18-23. What is important to review in the COP Transcript is that 
no person - either Jensen or the Court - actually explained to Arellano what malice aforethought 
or premeditation was. The prosecutor at.that hearing addressed this in stating: 
Your Honor, maybe before I do that, I wonder if- to the extent there 
might be a difference between malice aforethought and premeditation, I 
don't know if there needs to be an additional question to the defendant 
about acknowledging the premeditation as part of the guilty plea pursuant 
to Alford or if that's already been done? 
COP Transcript at 26, LL 12-19. Following this inquiry, Mr. Cannon set forth what he saw the 
facts to be that would support premeditation. Id. at 27-29. However, after the facts were stated, 
no person inquired of Mr. Arellano as to whether he understood what malice aforethought was, 
whether he understood what premeditation was, or whether he believed the stated facts would 
show malice aforethought or premeditation. Instead, the following inquiry occurred: 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cannon. Mr. Arellano, if the evidence 
was presented to a jury as Mr. Cannon just described, I think there is a 
sufficiently strong indication that a jury could find you guilty of the 
element of premeditation or malice aforethought, and I will so indicate to 
you with respect to your North Carolina vs. Alford plea on that element. 
Mr. Arellano, do you want to /rave a trial? We have a trial date 
scheduled for you in January. 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
COP Transcript at 29, L. 22 through 30, LL 7. At no time did anyone ask Arellano any question 
that would indicate that he actually understood the elements of malice aforethought or 
premeditation. And, if Jensen did have a discussion with Arellano on the same (which is most 
likely not the case, as explained above), Jensen would have provided incorrect legal information 
on these elements. 




Finally, the record is also clear that Jensen simply viewed the role of a potential second-
degree murder conviction in an incorrect way - as being the same as a first-degree murder 
conviction. Jensen testified: 
Q. Mr. Jensen, you testified earlier during direct that it was your feeling 
that voluntary manslaughter was the best defense for the defendant, 
instead of second degree murder, lesser included on first degree. Why is 
that? 
A. First degree and second degree murder have life sentences. If we're 
looking at an alternate 011tcome obviously, I guess,Jor visual aspects, 
second degree looks better tl1an1irsi degree, but Jliey still liave the same 
maximum penalty. So I didn't see there was a big difference tl,ere to be 
gained. But if we co11/d win a voluntary manslaughter defense then 
obvio11sly we've taken tl,e life sentence off tl1e table and gotten tl,e 
maximum sentence down to 15 years. 
Transcript at 108, Ll. 10-18. Jensen, in failing to see a difference between first-degree murder 
and second-degree murder, completely failed to analyze the elements of the charges, the 
potential penalties for the charges, or the potential outcomes at a sentencing hearing for both 
charges. 
What is the most ironic part of this matter is that Jensen, in preparing for sentencing, 
thought that Arellano had entered a plea to second-degree murder. Jensen lodged with the Court 
a Sentencing Memorandum (introduced as Exhibit 105 at trial in this matter), in which Jensen 
states, "Mr. Arellano pied guilty to second-degree murder ... "3 The most ironic part of Jensen's 
Sentencing Memorandum, though, is that he cited cases to support a lesser penalty for Arellano -
and, all of the cases that he cited were second-degree murder cases. And, it's clear that he cited 
the cases in the Sentencing Memorandum because they were the most similar to what Jensen 
wanted to argue, in way of sentencing. These cases - and the sentencing memorandum - simply 
demonstrate that a second degree murder conviction would have greatly benefitted Arellano, 
despite Jensen not seeing the difference between first and second degree murder convictions. 
3 Jensen continued his belief that Arellano plead guilty to second degree murder at the trial in this matter until his 
thought was corrected by counsel. See Transcript at 68, LI. 9-10. 




With all of the comments above, it is clear that Jensen failed to address a second degree 
murder potential, failed to understand the difference between the elements of first and second 
degree murder, failed to understand the difference that a conviction to second degree murder 
could make at sentencing, failed to understand what Arellano actually entered a plea to, and 
failed entirely in advising Arellano as to the potential outcome of a second-degree murder 
conviction. As such, when Arellano entered his Alford plea, he simply could not have been 
doing so knowingly and voluntarily because of Jensen's deficient performance as Arellano's 
counsel. And, with that, the first prong of Strickland is clearly met. 
2. Had Jensen's performance as Arellano's attorney not been deficient in his advice on 
second-degree murder and the application of the facts of the case as they relate to 
the same, Arellano would not have entered his plea and would have proceeded to 
trial. 
Arellano testified clearly at the trial in this matter that now that he has learned of the 
differences between first and second degree murder (and the elements of malice aforethought 
and premeditation), that he wants to proceed to trial. Transcript at 125-126. Arellano testified 
that he wants to go to trial because he did not have the intention to kill his wife. Id. at 126, LL 
11-19. Furthermore, in looking at all of the facts (as described above), there is a real potential 
for an outcome of a second-degree murder conviction at trial. As such, had Jensen advised 
Arellano appropriately as to a potential argument of second-degree murder (both in the elements 
and potential penalties on the same), Arellano would have gone to trial. With this, the second 
prong of Strickland is clearly established. 
In the very least, Arellano should have the ability to understand the elements of the crime 
for which he is charged, the potential defenses, and the potential lesser-included offenses of 
which he could be found guilty before entering a guilty plea to first degree murder. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner requests that this Court allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea and 
proceed forward to trial. 
DATED this 161h day of March, 2017. 
By: 
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HILVERDA McRAE, PLLC 
c~ 
Stcv<:.McRae 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
__________ -.cl 
Case No. CV 2013-390 
RESPONDENT'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
COMES NOW, Respondent, the State ofldaho, by and through Cassia County Prosecuting 
15 Attorney Douglas G. Abenroth, and does hereby provide this post-trial brief in opposition to 
16 Petitioner Juan Manuel Arellano's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Idaho Code 
17 Section 19-4906( c ). 
18 
I. 
19 Factual And Procedural History 
20 On December 30, 2010, the Petitioner Juan Manuel Arellano (hereinafter "Arellano") pied 
21 guilty to murder in the first degree with an enhanced penalty for use of a firearm or deadly weapon in 
22 violation ofldaho Code§§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003, and 19-2520 in the District Court of the Fifth 
23 Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for Cassia County in Cassia County Criminal Case No. 
24 CR-2010-4251 (hereinafter "underlying criminal case"). 
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On April 28, 2011, the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for Cassia County, entered a judgment of conviction against Arellano in the underlying criminal case, 
for murder in the first degree with an enhanced penalty for use of a fireann or deadly weapon in 
violation ofldaho Code§§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003, and 19-2520. The District Court sentenced 
Arellano to a unified tenn of life, with a minimum period of confinement of twenty-two (22) years, and 
this sentence was imposed. Arellano was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Corrections to serve his unified life sentence. 
On May 16, 2011, Arellano filed a motion for relief under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 seeking a 
reduction of his sentence. On May 19, 2011, the State ofldaho filed an objection to Arellano's Rule 35 
10 motion. The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Cassia County, 
11 entered an order denying Arellano's Rule 35 motion on May 23, 2011. 
12 Arellano filed a Notice of Appeal of his judgment of conviction and the denial of his Rule 35 
13 motion with the Idaho Court of Appeals. On appeal, Arellano argued his sentence was excessive. The 
14 Idaho Court of Appeals affinned the trial court's judgment of conviction and his sentence on May 7, 
15 2012. The Idaho Court of Appeals issued a Remittitur on May 31, 2012. 
16 On May 1, 2013, Arellano filed a petition for post-conviction relief, a supporting brief, his own 
17 affidavit in support of said petition, and attached exhibits to said affidavit. The State of Idaho filed an 
18 answer to the above-entitled post-conviction petition on May 20, 2013. On November 14, 2013, the 
19 State of Idaho filed a motion for summary dismissal and motion for summary disposition with a 
20 supporting brief and affidavit. On February 5, 2014, Arellano filed an objection to the State's motion 
21 for summary disposition. On February 12, 2014, the State filed a reply brief in support of its motions 
22 for summary dismissal and summary disposition. On February 18, 2014, the Court issued an order 
23 granting the State's motion for summary disposition. 
24 
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On March 19, 20 l 4, Arellano filed a notice of appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Court assigned the case to the Idaho Court of Appeals. Specifically, Arellano appealed the 
Court's granting of the State's motion for summary disposition. On May 27, 2015, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals issued an opinion affirming the District Court's decision to grant the State's motion for 
summary disposition, in part, and also vacating in part the District's decision on said motion. The 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to District Court for an evidentiary hearing on one issue raised in 
Arellano's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Upon remand, the one issue remaining to litigate in Arellano's petition for post-conviction 
relief is whether Arellano allegedly informed his defense counsel, Kent Jensen (hereinafter "Mr. 
10 Jensen), about his mental state when he killed his wife and whether Mr. Jensen allegedly informed him 
11 that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant in his underlying criminal case. See Arellano v. 
12 State of Idaho, Idaho Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 4-5. The Idaho Court 
13 of Appeals held Arellano had alleged a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr. 
14 Jensen in his petition for post-conviction relief on this issue of mental intent and remanded for an 
15 evidentiary hearing on this limited issue. Id. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on this 
16 issue on January 13, 2017. 
17 Based upon the applicable law and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the Court 
18 should deny Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen regarding this 







A. General Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a new civil proceeding and the petitioner 
bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. 
24 
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Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,522, 164 P.3d 798,802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 
678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827,830,452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Mu"ay v. 
State, 121 Idaho 918,921,828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App.1992); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816, 
892 P .2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). "Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction 
relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-
conviction reliefis based.'' Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 PJd at 802, citing Grube v. State, 134 
Idaho 24, 995 P 2d 794 (2000); see also I.C. § 19-4907; see also Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 
P.2d 654,656 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations showing each essential element of 
10 the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual allegations. Roman v. 
11 State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822,824, 702 
12 P.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may take judicial notice of the record of the 
13 underlying criminal case. Hays v. Stale, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P 2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 1987), affd 
14 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,842 
15 P.2d 660 (1992). 
16 
17 
B. Legal Standards AQPlicable for Proving a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate both 
l 8 that (a) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (b) there is a 
19 reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been 
20 different Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 
21 937 P.2d 427,430 (Ct. App. 1997). "Because of the distorting effects ofhindsight in reconstructing the 
22 circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong preswnption that counsel's 
23 performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance-that is, 'sound trial 
24 strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P .2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A 
petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made 
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" to establish that counsel's 
perfonnance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. 
Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Str(Q}dand, 466 U.S. at 690). 
"When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-
guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction 
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
9 relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
10 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008), citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,584, 6 P.3d 831,834 (2000). 
11 "There is a strong presumption that counsel's perfonnance fell within the wide range of professional 
12 assistance." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136, citing State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 
13 496, 511, 988 P .2d 1170, 1185 ( 1999) (internal quotations omitted) ( quoting Aragon v. State, 114 
14 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)). 
15 Thus, the first element - deficient perfonnance - "D requires showing that counsel made errors 
16 so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
l 7 Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The second element-prejudice- requires a showing that 
18 counsel's deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's 
19 deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been 
20 different Id at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct App. 1999). 
21 Regarding the second element, a Petitioner has the burden of showing that his or her trial counsel's 
22 deficient conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot 
23 be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 
24 80, 844 P .2d 706, 709 (1992). As explained in Ivey v. State, the "constitutional requirement for 
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effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long 
series of examples of how the case might have been tried better." Id., 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709. 
m. 
Argument 
Arellano alleges that his defense counsel, Kent Jensen, was ineffective in representing Arellano 
in his underlying criminal case. Specifically, the factual claim before the Court on remand from the 
Idaho Court of Appeals is whether Arellano allegedly infonned Mr. Jensen about his mental state when 
he killed his wife and whether Mr. Jensen allegedly infonned him that facts concerning his mental state 
were irrelevant in his underlying criminal case. See Arellano v. State of Idaho, Idaho Court of Appeals 
2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 4-5. However, Arellano' s ineffective assistance of counsel 
10 
claim against Mr. Jensen fails to state any claim for relief. As such, Arellano was not denied due 
11 
process oflaw by any alleged ineffectiveness of counsel in his underlying criminal case. Therefore, the 
12 
Court should deny Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and dismiss Arellano's petition 
13 
for post-conviction relief. 
14 
15 
In framing the issue for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
first relied upon certain factual allegations contained within Arellano's petition for post-conviction 
16 









29. Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with violence against his 
wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident because of the blind rage upon seeing her 
come back into the bar after her lover had escorted her out 
30. A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state was lacking on all 
the assault charges as he was under the influence of two drugs and the culmination of emotions 
that his wife intentionally provoked. 
51. No one knows wh[at] petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun and walked out onto 
the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his emotions overwhelmed him, and wanted to rant 
and rave. 
52. Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the heat of his passion as he 
was attempting to scare her. He never intended to kill her, but the rage within was so 
overwhelming that he was out of control and even more by the acts of others. 
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54. Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with a weapon in the heat 
of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she intentionally came back into the bar. 
See Arellano v. State of Idaho, Idaho Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 3-4, 
see also Petition for Post-Conviction, pp. 6, 9. 
The Court of Appeals then relied upon the following assertions by Arellano against Mr. Jensen 
in support of its decision that aprimafacie case existed in supporting Arellano's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim regarding his mental intent: 
53. Under the professional norms counsel's assistance amounted to incompetence. Counsel 
failed entirely in his representation. 
55. Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
56. Petitioner asserts that there exist[s] a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 
57. Counsel's failures prejudice[d] petitioner and if he would have fulfilled his obligations he 
would never have been convicted of any of the charges filed by information. 
58. Petitioner advised his attorney [of] his version of the facts surrounding the death of his wife. 
Yet counsel insisted that some of these facts were irrelevant, and that if he went to trial he 
would be found guilty. As a result of counsel refusing to participate in petitioner's defense he 
entered a guilty plea. 
See Arellano v. State of Idaho, Idaho Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, p. 4, see 
15 
also Petition for Post-Conviction, p. 9. 
16 
17 
Based upon Idaho law, Arellano had the burden of proving these specific assertions as alleged 
in his petition for post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the evidence during his evidentiary 
18 
hearing held on January 13, 2017. See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. Arellano 
19 
failed to satisfy his burden of proof during the evidentiary hearing in proving these specific allegations. 
20 
21 
During the evidentiary hearing, and in his post-trial brief, Arellano attempts to refrarne the 
relevant issue as articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Rather than trying to prove I) whether 
22 
Arellano allegedly informed Mr. Jensen about his mental state when he killed his wife and 2) whether 
23 
Mr. Jensen allegedly informed him that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant, Arellano 
24 
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attempts to prove and argue a different claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr. Jensen. 
Arellano now claims Mr. Jensen was deficient. in violation of Strickland v. Washington, supra, in the 
following manner: 1) Mr. Jensen failed to advise Arellano as to the elements and facts relating to 
second-degree murder, including the difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder 
and specifically the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation, and 2) Mr. Jensen failed to 
understand and/or communicate with Arellano the impact of a potential second-degree murder 
conviction. See Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief, p. 2. 
First, Arellano's attempt to refine, amend, or change his claim(s) of ineffective assistance of 
counsel against Mr. Jensen in his post-trial brief is not permitted under the Idaho Rules of Civil 
1 O Procedure. Arellano never moved to amend his claim(s) as alleged in his petition for post-conviction 
11 relief prior to, or during, the evidentiary hearing pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
12 Moreover, the Court never granted an amendment of Arellano' s claim(s) prior to, or during, the 
13 evidentiary hearing on January 13, 2017. As such, Arellano is prohibited from amending his claim at 
14 this stage of the proceedings as the State of Idaho would be prejudiced for lack of notice of said 
15 claim( s ). 
16 Second, even if the Court allows Arellano to allege, and argue, his amended claims of 
17 ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr. Jensen, he has failed to satisfy the burden of proof for said 
18 claims. During the evidentiary hearing, Arellano presented the testimony of two witnesses: Mr. Jensen 
19 and himself. Arellano also presented numerous exhibits which the Court admitted by stipulation 
20 between the parties or by Arellano laying sufficient foundation. Further, the State ofldaho presented 
21 multiple exhibits which the Court admitted by way of stipulation between the parties. 
22 On its own, the testimony of Mr. Jensen establishes that a) his performance as counsel for 
23 Arellano during the underlying criminal proceeding did not fall below an objective standard of 
24 reasonableness, and b) that Arellano was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiency of Mr. Jensen. See 
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Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Transcript, p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25. 
Moreover, State's Exhibits A and B, which were admitted into evidence during the evidentiary hearing, 
assist in establishing Mr. Jensen was not deficient in his perfonnance as counsel for Arellano nor did 
any alleged deficiency of, or by, Mr. Jensen prejudice Arellano in his underlying criminal case. In 
short, Mr. Jensen testified he discussed the requisite mental intent for first-degree murder with 
Arellano, and specifically, did so after receiving discovery containing text messages sent by Arellano 
to a friend a few hours prior to killing his wife. See Transcript. p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25, see also State's 
Exhibits A and B. 
Mr. Jensen's testimony, and State's Exhibits A and B, establish 1) Mr. Jensen discussed 
10 Arellano's mental state (i.e. mental intent) when he killed his wife and 2) Mr. Jensen did not inform 
11 Arellano that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant. See Arellano v. State of Idaho, Idaho 
12 Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 3-5; see also Petition for Post-Conviction, 
13 pp. 6, 9. In contrast, Mr. Jensen did discuss Arellano's mental state/mental intent when he killed his 
14 wife with Arellano. See Transcript, p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25, see also State's Exhibits A and B. Mr. 
15 Jensen also did not tell Arellano his mental state/mental intent at the time he killed his wife was 
16 irrelevant See Transcript, p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25, see also State's Exhibits A and B. Therefore, 
17 Arellano has not satisfied either the first or second prongs of Strickland v. Washington, supra, and has 
18 not proven an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen on the issue remanded by the 
19 Idaho Court of Appeals to the District Court. As a result, the Court should dismiss Arellano's petition 
20 for post-conviction relief. 
21 In addition, Arellano ex.pends much effort in arguing Mr. Jensen's deficiency, and subsequent 
22 prejudice to Arellano, regarding Mr. Jensen's failure to explain the mental intent required for second-
23 degree murder. See generally Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief.The record disproves this argument. Mr. 
24 Jensen testified that he "couldn't get [the prosecutor] to accept anything less than [first degree murder]. 
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So as far as second degree murder goes, I don't recall if it was ever in play, other than I guess it could 
have been a potential lesser included offense than the first degree murder if the case had gone to trial." 
See Transcript, p. 76, LI. 14-19. Moreover, Mr. Jensen did not recall having a discussion with Arellano 
about the difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder and testified he believed 
part of the reason for that ''was [the prosecutor] just didn't make that offer to us at all." See Transcript, 
p. 101, LI. 17-20. Since the parties resolved the underlying criminal case through plea negotiations 
wherein the prosecutor for the State of Idaho never offered second-degree murder or voluntary 
manslaughter to Arellano pursuant to those negotiations, it is not deficient performance by Mr. Jensen 
9 to not discuss a crime (i.e. second-degree murder and/or voluntary manslaughter) which is not offered 
10 by the State to the defendant (i.e. Arellano). Second-degree murder was not even option for Arellano to 
11 consider during plea negotiations, and as such, it is reasonable for Mr. Jensen to not discuss something 
12 with Arellano that is not ever offered by the State in negotiations. See Transcript, p. 76, LI. 14-19; see 
13 
14 
also Transcript, p. 101, LI. 17-20. Therefore, Mr. Jensen satisfied the requirements of Stricklandv. 
Washington, supra. 
15 Furthermore, since the underlying criminal case never went to trial, Mr. Jensen did not have the 
16 opportunity to even present a lesser included defense, or jury instruction, for second-degree murder or 
17 voluntary manslaughter to a jury. However, even though the underlying criminal case never went to 
18 trial, the record establishes Mr. Jensen did discuss with Arellano his mental state/mental intent at the 
19 time he killed his wife and discussed the relevancy of said mental state/mental intent with Arellano. 





the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
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Arellano's petition for post-conviction relief fails to establish his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for the issue remanded by the Idaho Court of Appeals to the District Court. 
The Court should deny Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen regarding 
the limited issue of mental intent, and its relevancy to Arellano's underlying criminal case, and dismiss 
his petition for post-conviction relief. 
DA TED this 26th day of April, 2017. 
Do~~enro~~ 
Prosecuting Attorney 
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Case No. CV-2013-390 
PETITIO:NER'S REPLY POST-TRIAL 
BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Juan Manuel Arellano ("Arellano"), by and through his 
attorney of record, Steven R. McRae of the firm Hilverda McRae, PLLC, and submits this Reply 
Post-Trial Brief (this .. Reply'J in response to the State's Respondent's Post-Trial Brief (the 
~~Respondent's Brief'). 
ARGUMENT 
This Reply is made to address the specific issues raised in the Respondent's Brief 
Petitioner continues to rely on the Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief as has been filed previously and 
relies on the arguments set forth therein. 
T"II, ___ ..._ ... -•- .... ___ •• n-.--. ..,.._,.. ... n--- • 
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1. THE ST ATE CAN NO LONGER ARGUE THAT PETITIONER'S PETITIONER FAILS TO ST ATE 
ANY CLAIM FOR RELIEF, 
The State argues, "Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen 
fails to state any claim for relief.., Respondent's Brief at 6. The State then asks this Court to 
deny Petitioner's petition on such grounds. This argument has already been decided and framed 
by the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in this case. Arellano v. State, 2015 Opinion No. 30, 
May 27, 2017. The Court of Appeals held in the same that Petitioner's petition did state a claim 
for relief, and 1he same further defined the issue that was to be trieu at evidentiary hearing (as is 
described in detail below). 
The State's argument that Petitioner's claims (and in particular those claims ruled by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals) should be summary dismissed have been decided, and this Court must 
now analyze the information as was presented at evidentiary hearing in conjunction with the 
issues allowed to be presented by the Idaho Court of Appeals decision. 
2. PETITIONER ts ARGUMENTS ARE DIRECTLY WITHIN THE PARAMETERS AS SET FORTH BY 
THE IDAHO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION. 
The State next argues that Petitioner has attempted to "refine, amend, or change" his 
claims following the hearing in this matter. Respondent's Brief at 8. Petitioner framed the issues 
in his Post-Trial Brief as follows: 
... Arellano now argues that Kent Jensen was deficient in his performance as 
Arellano's attorney as follows: 1) Jensen failed to advise Arellano as to the 
elements and application of facts as they relate to second-degree murder (and 
the difference of second-degree murder from first-degree murder) and 
specifically the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation, and 2) 
Jensen failed to understand and/or communicate with Arellano the impact of a 
potential second-degree murder conviction. 
See Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief at 2. 
This framework for the Petitioner's argument is within the scope set forth by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals decision. The relevant portion of the same is as follows: 
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This Court interprets assertion 58, based on the other relevant assertions listed 
in the petition, to aver that Are/la,ro informed defense counsel about his 
mental state when he killed his wife and that defense counsel informed him 
that facts concerning his mental stqte were Irrelevant. This interpretation is 
bolstered by Arellano's objection to the motion for summary dismissal, in 
which counsel explained that Arellano "avers that his {defense} counsel 
advised him that his mental state at the time of the alleged htcide11t was not 
relevant to the case." This interpretation is also consistent with the district 
court's characterization of the claim, in which it explained that "Arellano 
contends that [defense counsel] told him that evidence of the victim's intentions 
and his mental state ... was not relevant." 
However, unlike the district court, we are persuaded that the claim is not bare 
and conclusorv. and we are also persuaded that there is admissible evidence 
supporting the claim. Arellano 's pro se claim is not artfully plell, yet the 
assertions listed above do add up to a claim asserting tliat defense counsel 
provided deficient performance by ,,dvising him that facts concerning 
Arel/ano's metttal state when he killed his wife were irrelevant. Taking the 
other factual assertions offered by Arellano as true about the circumstances 
leading up to his wife's death, Arellano's mental state was relevant, as Arellano 
explained that he was in "a blind rage" after seeing his wife return to the bar 
and that his rage was "overwhelming." Indeed, evidence challenging the 
premeditation element of first degree murder might lead a Jury to convict of 
the lesser charge of second degree murder, LC.§ 18-4003(ll) and (g). and the 
11nlawful killing of a human being in the heat of passion is voluntary 
manslaughter, not murder, J.C. § J&.4006. Therefore, Arellano's assertions 
support a prima facie case of deficient performance by defense counsel when, 
as Arellano alleges, counsel insisted that facts concerning Arellano's mental 
state when Arellano killed his wife were irrelevant. 
Are llano's assertions also set forth a prima facie case of prejudice. Beyond 
claiming that he would not have pied guilty and insisted on going to trial, 
Arellano asserted that he pled guilty "[a]s a result of counsel refusing to 
participate in [his] defense." These assertions compliment the/act that 
Arellano entered an Alford plea by which he ref used to admit to the elements 
of malice aforethought and premeditation-elements that separate voluntary 
manslaughter from murder and separate second degree murder from first 
degree murder respectively. Taken together, Arellano has presented prima facie 
evidence of a reasonable probability that he would not have pied guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial, but for defense counsel's alleged deficient 
performance. 
Arellano v. State, 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2017 at 4-5 (emphasis added). The highlighted 
portions of this Opinion (as set forth above) show that the Idaho Court of Appeals narrowed the 
issue to be heard at evidentiary hearing as to the relevancy of Petitioner's mental status upon 
killing his wife and whether Jensen properly advised Petitioner of the same. 
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Petitioner has now narrowed the issue within the parameters set forth by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals because the Petitioner's argument remains that Jensen failed to discuss the relevancy 
of Petitioner's mental state in relation to second-degree murder. In fact, the issue of whether 
Jensen failed to properly advise Petitioner of the possibility of a second-degree murder 
conviction (by discussing the elements and application of the facts of Petitioner's case to the 
same) and the potential outcomes of a second-degree murder conviction is directly discussed by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals. In the above language, the Idaho Court of Appeals discusses why 
discussion of the elements of, application of, and effect of a second-degree murder possibility 
was critical to Arellano's representation: 
Indeed, evidence challenging the premeditation element o[flrst degree murder 
might lead a iurv to convict ofthe lesser charge of second degree murder, I.C. § 
J 8-4003(a) and (g) ... 
These assertions compliment the fact that Arellano entered an Alford plea by 
which he refused to admit to the elements of malice aforethought and 
premeditation-elements that separate voluntary manslaughter from murder 
and separate second degree murder from first degree murder respectively. 
Id. Arellano remains within the scope of the issues permitted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, and 
his refinement of the issues is entirely appropriate, and the State had notice of the parameters of 
the issues when the Idaho Court of Appeals entered its Opinion in this case. 
3. PETITIONER FULFILLED HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHOWING BOTH PRONGS OF 
STRICKLAND AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 
The State finally argues that Petitioner "has failed to satisfy the burden of proof for said 
claims." Respondent's Brief at 8. Petitioner does not wish to entirely restate the fulsome 
analysis as set forth in his Post-Trial Brief, Petitioner does wish to respond to some of the 
arguments as raised by the State. 
72
( ( 
First, the State argues that Jensen's explanation as to why he did not discuss with 
Petitioner the elements and application of the facts of second-degree murder was acceptable. 
Respondent's Brie/at 9-10. The State relies on Jensen's testimony that he: 
... couldn't get [the prosecutor] to accept anything less than [first degree 
murder]. So as far as second degree murder goes, I don't recall if it was ever 
in play, other than I guess it could have been a potential lesser included 
offense than the first degree murder if the case had gone to trial. 
Transcript, P. 101, LL 17-20. (emphasis added). In essence, as is outlined by the State in 
Re~pondent 's Brief, Jensen <lid not see any application of second-degree murder because th~ 
prosecutor in the case didn't make the offer for a plea to an amended second-degree murder 
charge. Respondent's Brief at l 0. The State summarizes this assertion in stating, "Second-
degree murder was not even [sic] option for Arellano to consider during plea negotiations, and as 
such, it is reasonable for Mr. Jensen to not discuss something with Arellano that is not ever 
offered by the State in negotiations." Id. The State finally argues that this argument is bolstered 
by the fact that Petitioner entered a guilty plea, and this case never went to trial. 
First, this analysis flies entirely in the face of the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in this 
matter. Again, the following language of the Idaho Court of Appeals decision comes into play: 
Indeed, evidence challenging the premeditation element of first degree murder 
might lead a iurv to convict of the lesser charge o(second degree murder, LC.§ 
18-4003(a) and (g) ... 
These assertions compliment the fact that Arellano entered an Alford plea by 
which he refused to admit to the elements of malice aforethought and 
premeditation-elements that separate volimtary manslaughter from murder 
and separate second degree murder from first degree murder respectively. 
Arellano v. State, 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2017 at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
This language first entirely contradicts the State's assertion that Jensen did not need to 
discuss the elements and application of facts to second degree murder because (as even Jensen 
recognized in his testimony), a very real possibility had the case gone to trial would have been a 
PETITIONER'S R.EPL Y POST· TRJAL BRIEF· 5 
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second-degree murder conviction. Furthermore, the State's assertion that because this case never 
went to trial, Jensen's failure to advise Petitioner of second-degree murder, is entirely misplaced. 
At the time that Petitioner entered his guilty plea to first-degree murder, he did so without any 
knowledge that there was a real possibility of an outcome of trial- and that outcome could have 
a significantly reduced sentence. 
Finally, on this topic, the idea asserted by the State that because the prosecutor didn't 
offer second-degree murder in plea discussions, Jensen didn't need to consider it or discuss it 
with Petitioner, is not only without a basis in law but appalling. Jensen - and the State in 
asserting this idea are essentially saying that the State has all power to determine what is or is not 
at consideration in a criminal case. It is at the very essence of providing effective assistance of 
counsel that a criminal defense attorney should consider - and communicate with his/her client -
the potential outcomes at trial, even if a prosecutor doesn't consider such an outcome as a 
possibility in a plea negotiation. 
Second, this cited language above acknowledges that the manner in which Petitioner 
entered his guilty plea- with an Alford plea to the mental elements of first~degree murder-
show the critical importance of Petitioner understanding the difference between first and second-
degree murder when entering his plea. Petitioner further relies on his argument in this regard as 
set forth in the Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief; however, it is worth reiterating that at no time during 
the change of plea hearing did anyone ask Arellano any question that would indicate that he 
actually understood the elements of malice aforethought or premeditation. See, generally, COP 
Transcript at 29, L. 22 through 30. LL 7 and Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief at 11. 





The foregoing argument fully addresses all of the issues raised by the State in the 
Respondent's Brief Petitioner requests that this Court allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty 
plea and proceed forward to trial. 
DATED this 281h day of April, 2017. 
PETITIONER'S REPLY POST-TRIAL BRIEF- 7 
HrLVERDA MCRAE, PLLC 
By:~ 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of April, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document upon the following: 
Cassia County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 7 
Burley. ID 83318 
Fax: (208) 878-2924 
PETITIONER'S REPLY POST-TRIAL BRIEF - 8 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ J Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail ~Fz:, 
~~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO 
On: 5/18/2017 04:25 PM 
JOSEPH W. LARSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Filed By: tg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, Case No. CV-2013-390 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO. 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In Cassia County case CR-2010-4251 ("the underlying case"), the Petitioner Juan Manuel 
Arellano ('"Mr. Arellano") pled guilty to the offense of murder in the first degree, with an A(ford1 
plea to the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation. See I.C. §§ 18-4001, I8-4003(a). 
On April 28, 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Arellano to a unified term of imprisonment of life 
with twenty-two years determinate and committed him to the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Correction tq serve his sentence. 
On May 3, 2013, Mr. Arellano filed the petition for post-conviction relief r·Petition") in 
this case. The Respondent State of Idaho ("the State") filed a motion for summary disposition. 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25. 37. 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171 (1970). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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On February 18, 2014, the court granted the State's motion for summary disposition and entered 
a judgment, dismissing the Petition in its entirety. 
Mr. Arellano filed an appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals vacated the judgment as to one 
of the claims in the Petition, affirmed the court's judgment as to all other claims in the Petition, 
and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 351 P .3d 
636 (Ct.App.2015). 
On January 13, 2017, the court conducted a trial on the one claim for post-conviction 
relief that remained after the appeal, and the parties were given the opportunity for post-trial 
briefing. On April 28. 2017, the court took the matter under advisement. 
The court issues the follO\ving findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and Idaho Code§ l 9-4907(a). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court determines that the facts set forth below were proved by a preponderance of 
substantial. material. and competent evidence produced at the trial in this case. 
Mr. Arellano and his wife, Ramona Monica Arellano Nanez ("Ms. Nanez"). had a very 
tumultuous relationship. On the evening of May 29, 2010. Mr. Arellano sent several text 
messages to Crystal Castaneda ("Ms. Castaneda''), a mutual friend of Mr. Arellano and ~ls. 
Nanez. One of Mr. Arellano' s text messages read, in reference to Ms. Nanez: ··v oi amatar esa 
piruja." (Def.'s Ex. A.) A certified interpreter translated this text message from Spanish into 
English as follows: '"I'm going to kill that whore." (Def's Ex. B.) 
That same evening, Mr. Arellano went to a bar in Burley, Idaho, known as ''El Paralito," 
and he took a handgun with him. He stayed at El Paralito for a period of time before Ms. Nanez 
arrived. When Ms. Nanez arrived and went out onto the dance floor with another man, Mr. 
FINDINGS OF FACT A'.'iD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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Arellano walked towards her. pointed his handgun at her, and fired a single shot that killed her. 
Mr. Arellano was arrested shortly thereafter. During his initial interview with law enforcement 
officers, Mr. Arellano admitted that he had planned to kill Ms. Nanez that night. 
The State filed multiple charges against Mr. Arellano, including the charge of first degree 
murder.2 Kent Jensen ('"Mr. Jensen") was Mr. Arellano's defense attorney. 
In developing a defense to the first degree murder charge, Mr. Jensen focused on the 
evidence of Mr. Arellano·s mental state and intent. Prior to receiving discovery from the State, 
Mr. Jensen discussed the case with Mr. Arellano, and Mr. Arellano told Mr. Jensen about his 
tumultuous relationship with Ms. Nanez. At that time, Mr. Jensen believed that the e'vidence in 
the case would not support the malice aforethought and premeditation elements of the offense of 
first degree murder. See LC.§§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003. At the trial in this case, Mr. Jensen 
testified as follows regarding his initial view of the underlying case and his discussions with Mr. 
Arellano: 
So it appeared to me that where he's at a bar, [Ms. Nanez] shows up with 
another man. he sees that, that falls into that category of voluntary manslaughter, 
where in the heat of passion the crime is committed. So that was the discussion 
initially with the case and how we proceeded from the point forward. 
So I explained to him at that time at that if his emotions were such that if 
he saw that and his emotions were inflamed because of what she was doing there, 
that he could be justified to the point, not of getting away with the crime and 
being absolved. there wouldn't be any - there were no self-defense issues as I 
explained to him -- but that he would be able to avoid the charge as it was initially 
filed. And if the jury agreed with our version of events and he could bear that out 
and show that it was in the heat of passion, then he'd get voluntary manslaughter. 
(Hr'gTr.18:9-14, 19:16-20:1 (Jan.13,2017).) 
1 The other charges included aggravated battery, attempted murder, and enhancements on each charge for the use of 
a deadly weapon. The aggravated battery charge was based upon the allegation that the bullet that killed Ms. Nanez 
exited her body and struck another person standing nearby. The attempted murder charge is based upon the 
allegation that Mr. Arellano threatened to kill and attempted to shoot another person at the bar who tried to 
intervene. 
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Later, in discovery, Mr. Jensen received evidence of the text message that Mr. Arellano 
sent to Ms. Castaneda approximately three or four hours before killing Ms. Nanez. Mr. Jensen 
testified as follows regarding how the text message affected his view of the case: 
... after I received that particular bit of evidence I went back and talked to 
Mr. Arellano about that, because in my opinion that changed the nature of the 
case. Because the texts were sent within hours of this occurring it suddenly 
changed the nature of the case from one of heat of passion, to one of intent. 
And then that's when I know we had that discussion at length about the 
difference of what he was facing, because at that point, you know, you're looking 
at -- if you go to trial and you've got a pretty good idea of what voluntary 
manslaughter is, you can present that defense to the jury, and in my opinion at 
that time the state didn't have any evidence that would indicate otherwise and I 
thought we had a pretty good shot at it. 
But once that text message showed up that changed the calculus because it 
was going to be very hard for us to walk in and argue that he did all of this in the 
heat of passion, having just sent this text earlier. So at that juncture I know we had 
that discussion about the prospects of going to trial and the difference. \Vhereas 
then the intent, premeditated and all that stuff, comes into play and that bolsters 
the state's case. We had that discussion, yes. 
(Hr'g Tr. 23:23-24:20 (Jan. 13, 2017).) 
l\.fr. Jensen explained to Mr. Arellano the effect of the text message on his defense of the 
case. Although Mr. Jensen explained to Mr. Arellano the difference between first degree murder 
and voluntary manslaughter, Mr. Jensen did not recall if he discussed the difference between first 
degree murder and second degree murder. However, he testified that he did not believe that the 
distinction between first degree murder and second degree murder was important in the 
underlying case: 
Whether it was a first degree case, looking at premeditation; second degree case, 
looking at the intent issue on a potential lesser standard, it didn't matter to me 
under the facts of the circumstances at that point because of that text message. 
Because to me that -- you know, it didn't -- maybe the prosecutor wasn't going to 
push it into the premeditated range, but it certainly came out of the range of 
voluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion, because it did show that there was 
at least some rudimentary thought process or planning that was going into 
committing this crime, looking at it from the State's perspective and advising my 
client. 
Fl~DI:-.GS OFF A.CT A~D CO~CLLSIONS OF LA \V 
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(Hr'g Tr. 42:2-13 (Jan. 13, 2017).) 
The parties eventually negotiated a plea agreement. Before Mr. Arellano entered into the 
plea agreement, Mr. Jensen and Mr. Arellano had a conversation about the strength of the State's 
evidence that would support the first degree murder charge. Mr. Jensen testified about this 
conversation as follows: 
The conversation involved looking at the evidence from what would be 
established and if we went ahead with the voluntary manslaughter defense. They 
would use the text to show that he had designs to carry out this crime, that he'd 
thought about it and sent a text message ahead. Mr. Arellano disagreed with that 
particular point 
We then had a discussion about the plea bargain which was offered to him 
and whether that would mitigate -- it wasn't perfect, it was something that was 
offered to him, that he could take advantage ot~ If we went to trial of course that 
offer would not be on the table. 
So I didn't think that we could win a voluntary manslaughter defense, so at 
that point we were trying to figure out the best option for Mr. Arellano. I 
discussed with him that he could enter a plea. He wouldn't have to acknowledge 
that particular element of the crime, we could take advantage of the plea 
agreement \vhich had been offered and we could -- as I stated earlier, we could 
actually argue for less at sentencing. 
(Hr'g Tr. 59:13-60:16 (Jan. 13, 2017).) 
Mr. Arellano entered into the plea agreement with the State. As set forth above, Mr. 
Arellano pled guilty to the offense of first degree murder, with an A(lord plea to the elements of 
malice aforethought and premeditation. At the trial in this case, Mr. Arellano testified that at the 
time he entered his plea, he did not have an understanding of those elements. At the change of 
plea hearing, the prosecuting attorney, Blaine Cannon ("Mr. Cannon''), summarized the evidence 
that the State would present at trial to show the factual basis for the A(ford plea. Mr. Cannon 
discussed Mr. Arellano's text message to Ms. Castaneda, Mr. Arellano's admission to law 
enforcement officers that he was planning to kill Ms. Nanez that night. and the circumstances 
surrounding the events at El Paralito. (See Ex. 104, Tr. on Appeal 27:4-29:21 (Dec. 30, 2010).) 
Fl~DlNGS OFF ACT A:",iD CONCLUSIOJ".S OF LAW 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V 
In the opinion on appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals characterized the one remaining 
post-conviction claim as follows: .. [Mr.] Arellano informed defense counsel about his mental 
state when he killed his wife and ... defense counsel informed him that facts concerning his 
mental state were irrelevant." Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 711, 351 P .3d 636, 639 
(Ct.App.2015). 
Following trial, Mr. Arellano now contends that he is redefining the scope of his claim 
within the parameters of the appellate opinion. He no longer contends that Mr. Jensen gave him 
incorrect advice.3 Instead. he contends that Mr. Jensen failed to give him advice regarding the 
elements of second degree murder, the application of the facts to the elements of second degree 
murder, and the impact of a second degree murder conviction. (See Pefr's Post-Trial Br. 2.) He 
contends that Mr. Jensen's failure to give this advice was conduct that fell below an objective 
standard ofreasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result. 
The court will not determine whether Mr. Arellano's new post-trial argument constitutes 
an unpleaded claim that requires analysis under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l S(b)(2) or 
whether Mr. Arellano has redefined the scope of his claim. The court simply addresses the new 
argument that Mr. Arellano raised in his post-trial briefing. 
1. Legal Authority 
To obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner ··must prove by a preponderance of evidence 
the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." Thomas v. State, 161 
Idaho 655, ---, 389 P.3d 200, 202 (Ct.App.2017). ""To prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
3 Since Mr. Arellano did not make any argument or identify any evidence produced at trial to support the allegation 
that Mr. Jensen .. informed him that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant." the court considers this earlier 
argument to have been waived. 
Fl~Dl~GS OF FACT AND CONCUJSIONS OF LAW 
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counsel claim. the petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the 
petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency." Blackburn v. State, 161 Idaho 769, ---, 391 P.3d 
654, 657(Ct.App.2017) (citing Strickland i·. rvashington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064-65 (l 984 )). 
Under the deficient performance prong of a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, '·the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Blackburn, 161 Idaho at---, 391 P.3d at 658. "[S]trategic 
and tactical decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief 
under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted 
from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review." State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,500,348 P.3d 1, 115 (2015) (quoting Pratt 
r. State, 134 Idaho 581. 58-t. 6 P.3d 831. 834 (::WOO). 
Under the prejudice prong of a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claim, where 
the petitioner pled guilty in the underlying case, the petitioner must show "that as a result of 
counsel's deficient performance 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors. he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."' Ridgley v. State, 148 
Idaho 671. 676,127 P.3d 925, 930 (2010) (quoting Hill r. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct 
366, 370 ( 1985)). The petitioner must ''convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Jcanovic v. State, 159 Idaho 524, 
529, 363 P.3d 365, 370 (2015) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky. 559 U.S. 356, 372, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 
1485 (20 l 0)). To meet this burden, the petitioner must draw a causal connection between the 
alleged deficiency and the petitioner's decision to plead guilty. See Ridgley, l 48 Idaho at 677, 
227 P.3d at 93 l. 
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"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought ... " LC. 
§ 18-400 I. Express malice exists "when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to 
take away the life of a fellow creature." LC. § 18-4002. Implied malice exists ''when no 
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an 
abandoned and malignant heart." Id. "All murder ... which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the first degree." LC.§ 18-4003(a). 
2. Analvsis 
A. Mr. Arellano did not meet his burden of proving deficient performance 
under the first prong of Strickland. 
In this case, ~fr. Jensen spoke with Mr. Arellano and understood his version of the 
events. Mr. Jensen was aware that Mr. Arellano and Ms. Nanez had a tumultuous relationship. 
that Mr. Arellano stated he did not know Ms. Nanez would be at El Paralito on the night in 
question, that ~fr. Arellano denied that he had intended to kill ~'ls. Nanez. and that Mr. Arellano 
\Vas unwilling to admit to the malic'e aforethought and premeditation elements of first degree 
murder. However, Mr. Jensen was also aware that the State had evidence to support the malice 
aforethought and premeditation elements of first degree murder. The State had Mr. Arellano's 
text message and his statements to law enforcement officers regarding his intent to kill Ms. 
Nanez. Additionally, the State had evidence that Mr. Arellano took his hand!:,'Un, went to El 
Paralito, waited for a period of time, and then approached and shot Ms. Nanez. 
Mr. Jensen reviewed. analyzed. and weighed the evidence in the underlying case, and he 
discussed it with Mr. Arellano. Even though Mr. Arellano denied that he intended to kill Ms. 
Nanez, Mr. Jensen negotiated a plea agreement for Mr. Arellano due to the strength of the State's 
evidence. Mr. Arellano chose to plead guilty to first degree murder with an Alford plea as to the 
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elements of malice aforethought and premeditation. This plea allowed him to maintain his 
position that he lacked the requisite mental intent. 
Although Mr. Arellano now contends that Mr. Jensen should have advised him regarding 
the offense of second degree murder, Mr. Arellano was not charged with second degree murder. 
The State did not express any intention to amend the charge to second degree murder or make a 
plea offer for second degree murder. Further, Mr. Jensen correctly perceived that the State had 
evidence of premeditation to support the first degree murder charge if the case went to trial. 
Mr. Arellano did not cite to any rule, statute, or case law that requires a defense attorney, 
m negotiating a plea deal. to give advice to a criminal defendant regarding an uncharged, 
included offense. Further, he did not provide any specific evidence, in the form of testimony 
from an expert witness or otherwise, to establish that such advice would be required under an 
objective standard of reasonableness. The evidence and circumstances in the underlying case do 
not give rise to a reasonable inference that Mr. Jensen had an affirmative duty to advise Mr. 
Arellano regarding the offense of second degree murder. Therefore, Mr. Arellano did not meet 
his burden of proving that Mr. Jensen's performance in this regard fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness under the first prong of Strickland. 
B. Mr. Arellano did not meet his burden of proving prejudice under the second 
prong of Strickland. 
As set forth above, Mr. Arellano contends that if Mr. Jensen had advised him regarding 
the elements, application, and impact of a second degree murder conviction, he would not have 
pled guilty and he would have insisted on going to trial. 
Mr. Arellano did not provide evidence or testify at trial in this case regarding the specific 
reasons for his decision to plead guilty to first degree murder. In the absence of such evidence, it 
is not possible to evaluate a potential causal connection between Mr. Jensen's failure to advise 
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Mr. Arellano regarding second degree murder and Mr. Arellano's decision to plead guilty. 
However, it is likely that Mr. Arellano pied guilty for the same reasons that many criminal 
defendants plead guilty: he was aware of the evidence against him, he recognized the potential 
for a conviction on any or all of the charges if the case went to trial, and he wished to take 
advantage of the benefits offered in the plea agreement. If these were Mr. Arellano's reasons for 
pleading guilty, it is not clear how his lack of information and advice regarding the offense of 
second degree murder contributed to his decision to plead guilty. 
In post-trial briefing, Mr. Arellano contends that he would have insisted on going to trial 
because he did not have the intention to kill l\.fa. Nanez. However. this assertion is not new. The 
reason he entered an A/ford plea to the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation was 
that he would not admit that he intended to kill Ms. Nanez. Mr. Arellano also contends that he 
would have insisted on going to trial because "there is a real potential for an outcome of a 
second-degree murder conviction at trial." (Pefr's Post-Trial Br. 13.) However, Mr. Arellano did 
not provide sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. Although Mr. Arellano testified that 
he did not expect Ms. Nanez to be at El Paralito on the night in question, the State's evidence of 
premeditation consisted of Mr. Arellano' s own statements that he intended and planned to kill 
Ms. Nanez. as shown in his text message to Ms. Castaneda and in his statements in his initial 
interview with law enforcement officers. Therefore. Mr. Arellano' s version of the events does 
not persuade the court that there was "'real potential" for a jury to acquit Mr. Arellano on the first 
degree murder charge and then convict on the included oftense of second degree murder. 
If Mr. Jensen had given Mr. Arellano advice and information regarding second degree 
murder. the court is not convinced that a decision to reject the State's plea offer would have been 
rational under the circumstances. Such advice would not change the strength of the State's 
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evidence against Mr. Arellano or the benefits offered in the plea agreement. The court is not 
persuaded that, but for Mr. Jensen's failure to advise Mr. Arellano regarding second degree 
murder, there was a reasonable probability that Mr. Arellano would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial. Therefore, Mr. Arellano did not meet his burden of proving 
prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, Mr. Arellano' s 
application for post-conviction relief is denied. 
r--
lt is so ORDERED this/ f' day of:Vtay, 2017. 
Fl'.',iDl'.',iGS OF FACT A'.',iD CONCLL:SIONS OF LAW 
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ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Judgment is entered in favor of the Respondent State of Idaho and against the Petitioner 
Juan Manuel Arellano. The Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
,A.... 
DATED this _il ~ay of May, 2017. 
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
RIGHT TO APPEAL/LEA VE TO APPEAL IN FOR.MA PAUPERIS 
The Right: The court hereby advises the Petitioner of the right to appeal this Judgment 
within forty two (42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court. I.A.R. 14(a). 
In Forma Pauperis: The court further advises the Petitioner of the right of a person who is 
unable to pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, meaning the 
right as an indigent to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and the right to be 
represented by a court appointed attorney at no cost to the Petitioner. 
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Case No. CV-2013-390 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STA TE OF IDAHO, AND ITS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, DOUGLAS ABENROTH, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, Juan Manuel Arellano, appeals against the above-
named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law entered on the 181h day of May, 2017, by the Honorable Michael R.. Crabtree. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order 
described in Paragraph 1 above is an appealable Order under and pursuant to LA.R. l l(aXl). 
3. That the issues on appeal will include the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Judgment, and other issues to be determined at a later date. 
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4. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
record, in addition to those automatically included under I.AR. 28: 
(a) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which was entered on May 18, 
2017. 
(b) Judgment, which was entered on May 18, 2017. 
4. I certify: 
(a) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the Clerk's record because he is indigent; 
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
he is indigent; 
( c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20 I.A.R. and the Attorney General of Idaho. 
DATED THIS~ day of June, 2017. 
?{;j---· 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorney for Petitioner/ Appellant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of June, 2017 I served a true and correct copy 
of the within foregoing document upon the attorney named below in the manr.er noted: 
Douglas G. Abenroth 
Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box7 
Burleyt ID 83318 
Fax: (208) 878-2924 
Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court 
P .0. Box 83 720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720. Room 210 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Office of the State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane Ste 100 
Boise, Idaho 83 703 
Cassia County District Court 
1559 Overland Avenue 
Burley, ID 83318 
Maureen Newton 
Cassia County District Court 
I 559 Overland Ave. 
Burley, ID 83318 
Roxanne Patchell 
Cassia County District Court 
1559 Overland Ave. 
Burley, ID 83318 




[8] U.S. Mail 








Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984] 
Brian J. Hilverda [ISB No. 7952] 
Guy B. Zimmerman [ISB No. 9675] 
HIL VERDA MCRAE, PLLC 
812 Shoshone Street East 
P.O. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755 
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041 
e-mail: smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com 
Attorneys for PlaintifflAppellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO 
On: 6/5/2017 02:58 PM 
JOSEPH W. LARSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRIQ' COURT 
Filed By:£) 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 











Case No. CV-2013-390 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF STA TE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
COMES NOW Steven R. McRae, attorney for the Plaintiff/ Appellant, and moves the 
Court for an Order appointing the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office to represent 
the Plaintiff/Appellant, in all matters relating to the Plaintiff/Appellant's appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 2017. 
HIL VERDA MCRAE, PLLC 
B~ 
"stev.McRae 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing document upon the attorney(s) or person(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Doug Abenroth 
Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia County 
P.O. Box 7 
Burley, ID 83318 
Fax: (208) 878-2924 
Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720, Room 210 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Office of the State Appellate 
Pub I ic Defender 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite I 00 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Cassia County 
Clerk of the District Court 
1559 Overland Ave. 
Burley, ID 83318 
Fax: (208) 878-1010 
Maureen Newton 
Cassia County District Court 
1559 Overland Ave. 
Burley, ID 83318 
Roxanne Patchell 
Cassia County District Court 
1559 Overland Ave. 
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Case No. t;ll-2013-390 
NOTICE AND ORDER FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
TO: THE OFFICE OF THE IDAHO ST ATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The Petitioner has requested the aid of counsel in pursuing a direct appeal from the Order 
Granting the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal in this District Court. 
The Court being satisfied that said Petitioner is a needy person entitled to the services of 
the State Appellate Public Defender pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-852 and § 19-854 and the 
services of the State Appellate Public Defender are available pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-863A; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-870, that the State 
Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the Petitioner in all matters as indicated 
herein, or until relieved by this Court's order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Steven R. McRae remain as appointed counsel for the 
purpose of filing any motion(s) in the District Court which, if granted, could affect judgment, 
order or sentence in the action. Steven R. McRae shall remain as appointed counsel until all 
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motions have been decided and the time for appeal of those motions has run. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-963, that the County shall 
bear the cost of and produce to the State Appellate Public Defender a copy of the following 
within a reasonable time: 
1. The entire Clerk's Record to include all preliminary, pretrial, trial, sentencing and 
post-trial motions, minutes, documents, briefs, pleadings or related items which 
are regularly kept in the Clerk's file; 
2. All transcripts for all preliminary, pretrial, trial, evidentiary hearing and post-trial 
proceedings, conferences, voir dire, motion arguments, or related proceedings 
which are recorded by the Court and which have been previously prepared. All 
other transcripts to be provided in accordance with timelines set forth by the Idaho 
Supreme Court after the Notice of Appeal has been filed; 
3. The pre-sentence investigation report; 
4. All exhibits which can be copied onto an 8 1/2 by 11 inch paper size; 
5. A list of all exhibits which cannot be copied onto an 8 1 /2 inch paper size, and 
6. A docket sheet for both Magistrate and District Court documents or proceedings. 
If the State Appellate Public Defender's Office discovers during appellate preparation that 
an item, within control of the Clerk or Reporter is missing, omitted or not requested and it is 
necessary to the appeal, the items shall be produced and the cost shall be paid by the County. 
The State Appellate Public Defender's Office is provided the following information by 
the Court: 
1. The Defendant's current address is: 
Juan M. Arellano #99235 
ISCC, Unit J-210B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
DATED this /tlday of June, 2017. 
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I hereby certify that on this 1.Jhday of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
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Hilverda McRae, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1233 
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P.O. Box 7 
Burley, ID 83318 
Fax: (208) 878-2924 
Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
supremecourtdocuments@idcourts.net 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720, Room 210 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Office of the State Appellate 
Public Def ender 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane Ste 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Maureen Newton 
Cassia County District Court 
1559 Overland Ave. 
Burley, ID 83318 
Roxanne Patchell 
Cassia County District Court 
1559 Overland Ave. 













rpatchell(a)co. twin-falls.id. us 
-\e·~~~--
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE AND0RDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE P.O. CV-2013-390 - 3 
98
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 












Supreme Court Case No. 45179 
District Court Case No. CV 2013-390 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
______________ ) 
I, Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the District Court, of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Cassia, do hereby certify that the foregoing documents in the above-
entitled cause were compiled under my direction and are true and correct copies of the pleadings, 
documents and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Notice of Appeal and the entire 
reporter's transcript of the Sentencing Hearing. 
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause and 
confidential exhibits will be lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal of said Court on 
the qi'- day of __ ~~O<f-'l..,,.l1~r~----' 2017. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
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I, Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
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Plaintifrs Exhibit Invoice of Kent Jensen 1/13/17 
101 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Kent Jensen's Notes 1/13/17 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 1/13/17 
103 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Transcript of Arraignment, Change of Plea and Sent 
104 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Sentencing Memorandum with Authority Cited 
105 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Guilty Plea Advisory 1/13/17 
106 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Plea Agreement 
107 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Judgment of Conviction and Order 
108 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Psychological Report 1/13/17 
109 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit Memorandum in Support of Rule 35 Motion with 
110 Authority Cited 
Plaintifr s Exhibit Rule 35 Motion 
111 
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113 First Decree Murder 
Plaintiff's Exhibit NOT ADMITTED 
114 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Amended Information 1/13/17 
115 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Information 1/13/17 
116 
Plaintiff's Exhibit State's Response to Discovery Request 1/13/17 
117 
Plaintiff's Exhibit First State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
118 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Second State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
119 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Third State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
120 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Fourth State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
121 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Fifth State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
122 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Seventh State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
123 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Eighth State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
124 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Ninth State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
125 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Tenth State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
126 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Eleventh State's Supplemental Discovery Response 1/13/17 
127 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Twelfth State's Supplemental Discovery Response 
128 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Search Warrant photos of cell phones messages & 1/13/17 
128 A CD log 
Defendant's Photos cell phone text messages & phone call log 1/13/17 
Exhibit A 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Defendant's Transcript of translated text messages from Spanish 1/13/17 
Exhibit B to English 
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